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I Significance of U.S. Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
As a background to the topic of the changing role of the U.S. in the Nigerian Civil War, it 
is important to look at U.S. support for colonial independence movements after World 
War II in the Middle East and Africa.  Chapters two and three provide some historical 
background information dealing with Nigeria’s regional problems immediately prior to 
independence and the event leading up to and through the two military coups of 1966.  
Chapter five focuses more specifically on the Nigerian Civil War with a description of 
the military, diplomatic, and propaganda aspects of the conflict between 1967 and 1970.  
Chapters six and seven then use internal Nixon Administration documents detailing 
foreign policy decisions to show how the role of the U.S. government changed during the 
course of the Nigerian Civil War.  The conclusion will briefly summarize how the 
combined effects of U.S. foreign policy doctrine, Nigerian history, progress of the war, 
and U.S. popular opinion led to increased U.S. involvement in the war and how these 
same factors led to the abrupt U.S. withdrawal from this same involvement.   
 In the thirty plus years since the end of the Nigerian Civil War few historians 
have dedicated any work on the United States government’s role in the resolution of the 
conflict.  This is most likely due to the limited positive influence the U.S. exerted in the 
war.  What historians have overlooked by neglecting to write about the U.S. involvement 
is why the U.S. played such a small role in a war that contained many of the elements, 
which had previously attracted U.S. involvement in other regions of the world.  The 
Nigerian Civil War involved the Soviet Union, the organized starvation of a compelling 
group of pro-U.S. Africans by a military led government, strong popular opinion against 
2the U.S. policy, and a President who seemed to want to intervene on behalf of the 
Biafrans.  Yet despite these strong motivators the U.S. government refused to become 
significantly involved in the war beyond paying for international relief operations.   
Historiography 
Four books address the role of the Nixon Administration’s role in the war to 
varying degrees.  These four books are: International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 
1967-1970 by John J. Stremlau; Nigeria, Africa, and the United States by Robert B. 
Shepard; Uncertain Greatness by Roger Morris; and American Policy and African 
Famine by Joseph E. Thompson.  All agree that U.S. involvement increased over time 
because of demands by the American public to stop the growing starvation crisis in 
Biafra.  They also agree that President Richard Nixon supported the Biafran plight 
against the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG) while the U.S. State 
Department bureaucracy supported the continuation of U.S. support for a united Nigeria.  
The following paragraphs will highlight the opinions of these scholars on the motivations 
for U.S. involvement in the Nigerian Civil War and explain how this paper adds to and 
differs from their analysis. 
 Stremlau’s book covered the involvement of all foreign governments in the 
Nigerian Civil War.  He wanted to explain how African, European, and North American 
governments approached the problem of how to stop the suffering of civilians in Biafra 
without causing the disintegration of Nigeria.1 He explained, in his sections addressing 
U.S. involvement, that President Lyndon Johnson’s foreign policy was far more 
concerned with the Vietnam War, the Six Day War in the Middle East, and the 
 
1 John L. Stremlau, International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), xii. 
3preservation of the growing U.S./Soviet détente than with an African civil war.  Stremlau 
also explained the U.S. general desire for European nations to handle African political 
problems.2 Despite earlier indications of an increasing U.S. role in the conflict based on 
two campaign speeches made by Nixon, his administration’s eventual policy towards the 
war differed little from Johnson’s.  The only two changes according to Stremlau were the 
increasing relief assistance to Biafran civilians and the appointment of a U.S. Coordinator 
for Relief, both intended only to quiet critics within the Congress.3 Stremlau was in 
Nigeria in 1969 and based his book on extensive interviews with 140 people involved in 
the war, notably Generals Yakubu Gowon and Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu as 
well as U.S. Ambassador William Trueheart and Lord Malcolm Shepard, the British 
Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs.  Stremlau’s book is perhaps one of the most 
influential scholarly books on the subject of the Nigerian Civil War.  Unlike this paper, 
Stremlau focused little on the role of the United States in the conflict and more on the 
peace talks in Africa.  
Roger Morris, a member of both the Johnson and Nixon White House staffs 
explained how career bureaucrats in the State Department heavily influenced U.S. foreign 
policy decisions.  He argued that these bureaucrats placed their personal career interests 
ahead of the interests of the nation.  In the case of the Nigerian Civil War, Morris argued 
these bureaucrats took advantage of the general lack of strong opinion in the Nixon White 
House about the proper course of U.S. foreign policy to pursue in Nigeria resulting in the 
relative lack of U.S. involvement in the civil war.4 The Nixon Administration and the 
State Department worked at cross purposes with each other throughout the development 
 
2 Ibid., 63-65. 
3 Ibid., 293. 
4 Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 120. 
4of the U.S. policy towards Nigeria and compounding this problem was Nixon’s 
“wavering within himself” over what the appropriate course of action for the U.S. should 
be.  Morris argued Nixon’s foreign policy position was guided less by doctrinal 
considerations than by individual and organizational politics.5 Morris based his work on 
his own recollections from his experiences on Henry Kissinger’s staff as the National 
Security Council African Affairs Specialist.  Morris’s book is not a history like the others 
used in this paper.  It was more of an insider’s perspective on Henry Kissinger’s time as 
the National Security Chief.  It also included much of Morris’s personal feelings about 
how the political system worked in the U.S. during his career.  The book provided a 
perspective into the conflict between the National Security staff and the State Department 
during the Nixon Administration and explains some of the dynamics associated with 
creating a U.S. foreign policy approach to the Nigerian Civil War. 
 Shepard’s book describes the Nigerian/U.S. relationship from the Kennedy to the 
Reagan Administrations.  He dedicates one chapter to the civil war where he explains 
how Johnson paid the war little attention, and how Nixon’s early desire to increase U.S. 
involvement changed when he realized neither side was willing to negotiate an end to the 
war.  Like Stremlau, Shepard saw little difference between the two administration’s 
policies.  He argued Nixon’s initial interest in the Nigerian Civil War was based on his 
belief that the outcome of the Nigerian Civil War would not affect the U.S. significantly 
positively or negatively so he felt he could attempt to resolve the war as one of his first 
actions in office.  He directed Kissinger to study the war and provide him with policy 
options.  The result of the study showed the probability of a Nigerian victory and 
recommended a policy little different from that pursued by Johnson’s administration.  
 
5 Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 20. 
5Shepard argued that Nixon was the only person in his own administration who supported 
the Biafrans.6 His State Department never wavered in their support for the Nigerians and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger admitted he “never shared the president’s 
enthusiasm for the Biafran cause.”7 Shepard cited few primary sources in his discussion 
of the U.S. role in the Nigerian Civil War.  To make his points he used a few New York 
Times articles and used Roger Morris and John Stremlau’s histories as well as reporter 
John de St. Jorre’s account of the war.  Given the scope of Shepard’s book, he spent little 
time covering the Nigerian Civil War and the role of the United States.  His discussion of 
the war was simply one small aspect of the larger U.S./Nigerian relationship over a thirty-
year period. 
 Thompson’s pro-Biafran account of the Nigerian Civil War explains the large role 
the U.S. public played in the increased relief support given by the United States to the 
international relief community.  Thompson agrees with Stremlau and Shepard’s view of 
the primacy of the Vietnam War over events in Nigeria and like Morris explained how 
members of the State Department staff took advantage of the administration’s 
preoccupation with Vietnam to stall any policy changes towards supporting Biafra.  
Thompson used State Department records, the Congressional Record, and U.S. 
newspaper sources as his primary sources to show the popularity of the Biafran cause 
among the American people and U.S. Congress and explained how they influenced U.S. 
foreign policy decisions.  The book showed how the conflict between politics and relief 
proved a deadly combination for Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War.  Though his book 
did not provide a particularly balanced view of the war, he did make a significant point 
 
6 Shepard, 44. 
7 Ibid., 35. 
6about the role of the American people in the U.S. foreign policy making process.  He 
argued that the U.S. government wanted to avoid involvement in the war, but the U.S. 
public demands for humanitarian relief forced a policy adjustment.8
None of these authors cited the U.S. State Department archives or the Nixon 
White House documents in their research.  This is due to the fact that the Nixon sources 
were only declassified in April 2000.  This paper has taken advantage of the availability 
of these resources to understand more fully the motivations of individuals and 
organizations within the U.S. government between 1967 and 1970.  The State 
Department sources provided many detailed glimpses at the daily events in the U.S. 
Embassy in Lagos and the support of the FMG within the Embassy and within the U.S. 
State Department itself.  The Nixon Project documents shed great light on the 
background of many of the Nixon Administration’s decisions and the infighting between 
the NSC staff and the State Department.  The documents in this collection included a 
number of memorandums from Roger Morris to Henry Kissinger recommending specific 
courses of action for the President to take in the development of his policy towards 
Nigeria and Biafra.  It also contained similar memorandums from Kissinger to Nixon and 
decisions made by the President as well as many other related background memorandums 
and situation summaries.   
 Based on these documents and secondary sources this paper will explain how U.S. 
involvement in the Nigerian Civil War in 1969 went from avoiding any attempts at nation 
building or risking political involvement beyond relief funding, to engaging both sides in 
secret peace negotiations, and finally to the public criticism of the Biafran government 
and cessation of all U.S. diplomatic negotiation attempts.
 
8 Joseph E. Thompson, American Policy and African Famine (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 169. 
II U.S. Support of Colonial Independence  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
One issue central to U.S. involvement in the Nigerian Civil War was the conflict between 
the United States and Great Britain over colonial independence movements after World 
War II.    Generally speaking, the United States supported the retention of Britain’s 
colonies.  The exception to this general rule occurred when opponents of colonialism 
threatened to turn to communist nations for support of their independence or separatist 
movements.  In such cases, the United States applied political pressure to the British, 
forcing them to yield to the independence movements and U.S. foreign policy desires.  
As a consequence of this conflict, Great Britain increasingly ceded its former 
responsibility of defending challenges to post-colonial territorial integrity in Africa and 
Asia to the United States.   
Containing Communism 
The foremost U.S. foreign policy concern after WWII was the containment of 
communism.  One of the important methods the U.S. felt it could use to prevent 
communism from gaining a foothold in the third world was a strong stance against 
colonialism and in favor of dismantling European empires.  U.S. foreign policy doctrine 
feared Soviet rhetoric against western imperialism would prove a persuasive message for 
the nationalist groups in Africa and Asia.  Given no other option between pro-colonial 
capitalism and anti-imperialist communism, these groups would, according to the theory, 
gravitate towards the Soviet sphere of influence.  These groups threatened to realign 
regions or the entirety of former colonies with the Soviets.  The United States foreign 
policy makers believed the U.S. could counter the Soviets if they took a strong stand 
8against colonialism and could offer an attractive alternative to communism in these same 
regions of the world.  Despite their alliance during World War II, the United State’s anti-
colonial foreign policy put them at odds with Great Britain.  World War II weakened 
Great Britain economically and militarily and as a result they saw no other alternative to 
an increased role of the United States in maintaining the boundaries of their former 
colonies.*
W.R. Louis places particular emphasis on the importance of the U.S. in the British 
decision to decolonize its empire in his histories.  He argued that empires required 
acceptance within three areas, the colony, the metropole, and the international 
community.  In the case of British colonies in Africa, he argued that pressure to 
decolonize came from all three areas.  The British realized that the retention of their 
colonies in Africa was a losing proposition, but they did want to maintain their influence 
in the area.  British foreign policy makers believed that a rapid withdrawal from their 
colonies would allow them to appease all three groups and maintain their political and 
economic influence in the region.9
An editorial letter in Life magazine on October 12, 1942 summed up the 
American point of view on the British Empire stating, “the American people might 
disagree among themselves about war aims, but …one this we are sure we are not 
fighting for is to hold the British Empire together.”10 Louis went on to say that President 
 
* Central to our investigation are the works by W.R. Louis.  Who dealt specifically with the role the United 
States played in the dissolution of the British Empire.  In Imperialism at Bay, Louis looked the role of the 
United States in the decolonization of the British Empire during the Second World War.  Another important 
secondary source was chapter two entitled “The United States and the Liquidation of the British Empire in 
Tropical Africa, 1941-1951” in Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis’ book, The Transfer of Power in 
Africa.
9 Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, ed.  The Transfer of Power in Africa (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982), 55. 
10 Ibid., 33. 
9Franklin Roosevelt held this same view, but also believed that not all colonial holdings 
were ready for independence at the same time.11 Given Roosevelt’s anti-colonial 
feelings, he had to balance carefully these feelings with overall goal of winning the war.  
Despite his recognition of the importance of maintaining this balance, Roosevelt’s State 
Department proposed the “Declaration on National Independence for Colonies” in 
November 1942.  This declaration provided continued independence for free nations, the 
restoration of occupied ones, and the support for people who desired independence in the 
future.12 The British saw this declaration as a move by the U.S. towards “a sort of 
informal empire” based on U.S. economic domination.  Independence, in the words of 
one official in the British colonial office, “has no real meaning apart from economics.  
The Americans are quite ready to make their dependencies politically ‘independent’ 
while economically bound hand and foot to them and see no inconsistency in this.”13 
While the Americans criticized the British government, members of the British 
parliament’s radical left wing, and Indian nationalists were voicing similar critiques of 
the British Empire.  Based on the sum of these criticisms, the British government began 
to designate a portion of its budget to improve social and economic welfare of their 
African subjects.14 
U.S. anti-colonial pressure ebbed at the end of World War II, with the fears of 
communism in Italy and Southeast Asia trumping the voices of against continued 
European colonial occupations.  During this period, the U.S. tolerated continued 
colonialism so long as it provided a stable and effective buffer against communism.  But, 
 
11 Ibid., 33. 
12 Ibid., 34. 
13 Ibid., 35. 
14 Ibid., 38. 
10 
as the Dutch found out, Washington was more than willing to deny aid to the Netherlands 
in response to their perceived mishandling of nationalist forces in the Dutch East Indies 
which threatened to open the door to communism in that region.  According to Louis, the 
British fully realized the willingness of the U.S. government to withhold vital financial 
support from its allies in order to promote anti-communism and anti-colonialism (in that 
order) within European colonial territories.15 
British colonial policy, according to Louis, was a hands-off affair whenever 
possible.  The British preferred to govern their colonies locally and at the least possible 
cost to the government.  They believed colonial governments would eventually give way 
to local self-governmental bodies, and eventual transition to dominion status.  This 
process would begin once the former colony convinced the British that the colony could 
“look after British commercial and strategic interests.”16 
Transition in Africa 
Political transition in Africa did not follow this structured model.  Domestic and 
international anti-colonial pressures began to foretell the end of the British Empire and 
future transfers of power would not follow the British preferred course of decolonization.  
By 1947, a British governmental report revised the duration of the British colonial 
presence in Africa from a one hundred year estimate to a twenty-year projection.  
Additionally, the report acknowledged that ‘traditional’ African leaders were not capable 
of presiding over such a rapid economic and political change.  The British would have to 
entrust local elites with the accomplishment of this task.  The problem with this group, 
from a British perspective was their unwillingness to listen to any British plan that did 
 
15 Ibid., 46-47. 
16 Ibid., 51. 
11 
delayed independence.  The British therefore realized that the only way they could hope 
to retain influence in Africa among the new political class was to decolonize rapidly and 
create an informal empire within the region.17 Political unrest in Ghana in 1948 sped up 
this already accelerated plan of independence in West Africa, shortening once again, the 
timeline for African decolonization.  British leaders soon realized that the transition to 
independence within the region could not be given to one colony and not its neighbors.18 
As a result, the British Empire in Africa rapidly disintegrated in the thirteen years 
between 1947 and 1960. 
Louis credited American anti-colonialism as only one cause of many contributing 
to the dissolution of the British Empire in Africa.  The empire could not survive the 
assault from within the colonies, the British metropole, and the international community.  
The three groups fed off of each other’s increasingly strong position.  The end of World 
War II saw Great Britain’s position as a world power decline and the rise of the United 
States and Soviet Union.  This led to an increase in political pressure on the colonial 
powers from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to decolonize.  Simultaneously national groups within 
the colonies, emboldened by foreign support (at least verbal support) began to demand 
independence more openly.  These two groups caused citizens within the metropole to 
question the viability and profitability of maintaining their colonial empires.  This 
questioning led to a lack of willingness to support the colonies financially, which in turn 
decreased their leverage within the colonies.  This cycle continued until the metropole 
finally relented and dissolved their African empires.19 
17 Ibid., 42. 
18 Ibid., 43. 
19 Ibid., 54-55. 
12 
The Suez Crisis 
The Suez conflict in 1956 marked the first time the U.S. directly opposed British 
attempts to retain its colonial possessions and marked a significant shift in the Anglo-
U.S. relationship.  The crisis illustrated the ability of Great Britain to act militarily 
without the support of the U.S., but also showed British military action without U.S. 
financial support, oil, and military protection against the Soviet threat severely limited 
their ability to pursue a foreign policy independent of the United States.20 
The British also faced a challenge by the U.S. government in the Persian Gulf 
region.  Washington policy makers believed the days of British Empire were numbered in 
the Persian Gulf region as well.  The sooner independence could be granted to the British 
colonies in that region; the more likely they were to support the desires of the west.  
Many British critics of this U.S. policy believed that “supporting the desires of the west” 
really meant allowing U.S. oil companies greater access to Middle Eastern oil fields 
without British interference.21 As in other regions, the British deferred to the U.S. 
foreign policy and exited from the region. 
The Congo Crisis 
Before leaving the subject of U.S. foreign policy it is important to look at the U.S. 
involvement in the Congo after its independence in 1960.  This case provides us with an 
African secession crisis where U.S. foreign policy most clearly followed the trends of 
supporting anti-communist forces against western allies.  It also showed U.S. willingness 
to intervene in “internal” political conflicts in Africa, and the willingness of African 
nations to look increasingly to the United States to protect African borders.  Nigerian 
 
20 Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), 155. 
21 Ibid., 261. 
13 
politicians would later point to the U.S. actions in the Congo and question why the U.S. 
refused to support their cause just a few years later.   
The Congo received its independence from Belgium in 1960 and within weeks the 
military revolted over the retention of Belgian control in many of the officer positions.   
Adding to the problems caused by the military revolt for the inexperienced government 
was the eventual uneasy power sharing relationship between Prime Minister Joseph 
Kasavubu and President Patrice Lumumba.  Moïse Tshombe, the leading political figure 
in the mineral rich Congolese province of Katanga, took advantage of the political 
turbulence and seceded from the Congo with the backing of the Belgian government.  
Hoping to prevent the Katangan secession, Lumumba asked for and received military 
support from the Soviet Union.22 The U.S. government saw Lumumba’s move as a sign 
of his anti-Belgian and anti-Western tendencies.  Anti-Lumumbist elements in the 
Congolese government placed the president under house arrest in 1960 and assassinated 
him when he escaped in January 1961.  Historians have generally agreed the Belgian 
government and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency played some role in Lumumba’s 
death, but whatever their role, the assassination of Lumumba led to the rise of military 
chief of staff Joseph Mobutu.  Mobutu took control of the Congo from Kasavubu and 
eventually put down the Katangan secession in 1963.23 Other regional conflicts 
continued to plague the Congo throughout the 1960’s, but western desires for a united 
and anti-communist Congo led them to continue to support Mobutu.  Mobutu used this 
support to consolidate his power and rule as a dictator from 1965 until 1997. 
 
22 Frederick Cooper,  Africa Since 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 164. 
23 Ibid., 165. 
14 
Gowon learned through personal experience, U.S. foreign policy during the 1960s 
was guided by the self-interested principles of realpolitik where as he stated, 
“governments have no friends or enemies, just interests.”24 U.S. foreign policy bore out 
this truth in Africa and the Middle East where the United State tempered its anti-colonial 
feelings after World War II in favor of their desire to fight global communism.  In the 
cases where communism did not threaten regional stability, the United States was more 
than willing to allow Europe to maintain its colonies.  In these cases, the U.S. policy 
rationalized that European presence provided a barrier to communist influence and 
ensured ‘order,’ or at least open markets for the U.S.  In those instances when the 
communist forces offered their support, the anti-colonial policy of the U.S. was more 
evident.  The U.S. had shown itself willing to force the governments of Europe, through 
threats to withhold vital assistance and aid, in order to counter any communist 
penetration.  The United States hoped that these stands against colonialism and for 
independence would give the new nationalist organizations within the colonies an option 
other than communism.   
The United States actions in Nigeria during the period of civil war between 1967 
and 1970 did not follow this model.  Despite significant Soviet military support for the 
Federal Military Government in Nigeria, the U.S. refused to provide political or military 
support for the Biafrans.  In this case, the U.S. fear of communism’s growth in Africa 
was less serious than their political and economic interests in Nigeria.  The only 
consistency in U.S. foreign policy towards the Nigerian conflict was the protection of 
U.S. interests over ideology.  The standard justification for the lack of U.S. intervention 
in Nigeria or Biafra was the U.S. claim that the war was an internal Nigerian matter.  
 
24 Stremlau, International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 63. 
15 
Unlike the Middle East and the Congo where foreign military intervention necessitated 
U.S. involvement, the U.S. government discounted the Nigerian Civil War as a ‘tribal’ 
conflict.  The next chapter will investigate the underlying causes of the civil war and 
show how the war was not ‘tribal’, but simply a political struggle between parties who 
organized along regional lines.
III The Rise of Three Nigerias 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Motivations for secessionism within Nigeria were as old as the nation itself, dating back 
to the 1914 consolidation of Nigeria into a single colony by the British colonial 
administration.  Larry Diamond has argued that the most damaging colonial legacy in 
Nigeria was the construction of its artificial boundaries.  According to Diamond, feelings 
of regional identity in Nigeria grew from three major factors: ethnicity (including 
cultural, linguistic, and religious differences), political divisions, and literacy.  While the 
artificial identities forged by regional division flourished in the colony, the boundaries 
suppressed and discouraged the formation of a Nigerian national identity.  These 
divisions sowed the seeds of inevitable regional conflict.  Awolowo Obafemi summed up 
the lack of nationalism in Nigeria when he stated, “Nigeria is not a nation.  It is a mere 
geographical expression.”25 
Pre-colonial Nigeria 
 Pre-colonial Nigeria included many different states of differing size and political 
and economic systems.  Given the modern boundaries of Nigeria, it is easiest to describe 
the pre-colonial history of the Nigerian people in three main regions: east of the Niger 
River, west of the Niger River, and north of the Niger/Benue Rivers.  Though political 
groups within these three regions shared some traits, one should not infer that at any time 
in pre-colonial history were there three regional ethnic groups or nations that 
incorporated all of the people of these regions. 
 
25 Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1988), 26. 
17 
The people east of the Niger share linguistic characteristics from the Niger-Congo 
family and can be further subdivided into two groups: the Cross River Basin and the Kwa 
sub-families.  Three of the largest members of the Cross River Basin group are the 
Annang, Efik, and Ibibo.  The Igbo and Ijo are two of the largest of the Kwa group.  The 
Igbo language group and its various dialectical variations constitute the single most 
common language of both the Cross River Basin and Kwa groups.26 
The basic political formation within the eastern region was the family.  The Igbo 
people combined several independent, familial villages into regional federations where 
forms of checks and balances prevented abuses of leaders from the impacting the 
individual communities.  The confederations were localized and never formed large 
regional empires or kingdoms like the Kanuri, Oyo, or Benin kingdoms. In comparison, 
the Efik and Ibibo both had ruling families whose accession was elected and not strictly 
hereditary.27 
Economic expansion due to the growth of trade with Europeans “played the major 
role in transforming the socio-political systems of the peoples east of the Niger.”28 
European trade was a significant transforming process in the region because it created a 
class of wealthy men who derived their wealth outside of the control of their elders who 
had controlled wealth in the form of land.  These new elites transferred the political 
organization of the coastal regions from the loosely organized familial villages to tightly 
controlled trading houses.29 
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Though the Atlantic slave trade transformed the political systems of the eastern 
region, it did not change the divided political nature of the region.  Trading houses 
replaced the importance of agricultural and fishing villages, but did not unify the region 
prior to European conquest of southern Nigeria between 1850 and 1897.30 
The southwestern region includes many different political groups including the 
Yoruba, Edo, Itsekiri, Ijo, Urhobo, Igbo, and Egun.  These groups are not completely 
distinct from each other as they often borrowed customs and practices from each other.  
Most of these groups share a respect for age, connectivity between religion and every day 
affairs, and used the family as the basic unit of organization.31 Historians believe the 
Yoruba were the first group to create a regional identity beyond the village level.  
Regional oral histories cite the unification of thirteen settlements centered near the area 
of Ile-Ife as having created the Yoruba identity.  People leaving the Ile-Ife area founded 
kingdoms with customs and features similar to those present in Ile-Ife like the wearing of 
crowns by leaders and the construction of totems.  Two centralized and powerful political 
groups from the southwest region that followed the Ile-Ife/Yoruba pattern were the Benin 
and Oyo Empires.32 
The Benin Empire peaked in the 15th and 16th centuries owing much of its success 
to the weakness of their neighboring states, ability to adapt their political and cultural 
practices within their empire, and later due to their access to European firearms.33 The 
Oyo Empire grew in importance in the region due to its geographical position on the 
Niger River, where it could control access to the coast and conduct trade into the northern 
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interior.34 This control over regional trade led to an increase in economic power and an 
increased strength of the Oyo military by the middle of the sixteenth century.  The 
increased military power allowed the Oyo to increase the size of their empire.35 By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, wars and rebellions led to the creation of other 
political formations other than those based on Yoruba influences.    These wars also led 
to the increased involvement in the southwestern region by the British colonial 
government and the eventual destruction of the Oyo Empire.36 
Several other small polities developed in the region as offshoots of the Benin and 
Oyo Empires and from the interaction with other political groups in the southern region 
of modern Nigeria.  These groups did not form large kingdoms or confederacies; most 
were village and/or clan based with councils of elders serving as the government.37 They 
too declined in power with the increased presence of the British in the Niger Delta region 
near Lagos. 
The northern region included the Kanuri Empire in the northwestern savannah, 
the Hausa States in the north, and a collection of independent polities in the region known 
as the Middle Belt.  These polities ranged from the small, independent city-states of the 
Middle Belt, to the larger, but still autonomous Hausa States, to the centrally governed 
Kanuri Empire.38 
The Kanuri Empire was the first group to take advantage of the trade routes with 
North African and Middle Eastern markets and used this trade to increase its power in the 
region.  As early as the ninth century, Kanuri leaders combined military ability with 
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religious advantages of both Islam and local religions to increase their rule over smaller 
states in the north.39 The empire went through a period of decline in the eleventh century 
as a result of several rebellions in the empire, but re-established their power in a second 
Kanuri Empire in the sixteenth century.40 The government of the second empire included 
a central leader who ruled with the help of a council of 12 men and a separate group of 3 
women who ran the palace.41 The second empire eventually declined in the late 
nineteenth century weakened by disease and facing attack from the army of the Wadai. 
 The Hausa States in the northern region of modern Nigeria were never as large or 
centralized as the Kanuri Empire, but as a group the independent Hausa States occupied a 
large geographic portion of the north.  Initially politically based on villages, the Hausa 
States expanded their boundaries in proportion to the availability of natural resources.42 
The Hausa States never unified or formed alliances with each other and as a result, they 
remained small and divided throughout the pre-colonial period.  Like the Kanuri Empire, 
the leaders of the Hausa States adopted portions of Islamic religion and law to increase 
their power and rule their states.  The general political framework of these Hausa States 
included two parts, a capital city ruled by the Sarki, a descendent of the founder of the 
state, and provincial leaders who governed outlying areas for the Sarki.43 This system 
and its use of Islamic law made governing the states efficient.  The conquering Fulani 
maintained the Hausa system of government during their occupation of the Hausa States.  
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The British colonial government also used the Hausa system as a basis of their indirect 
rule of the region.44 
The last political groups of the northern region exist within the Middle Belt.  
These small polities were similar to independent ones in the southeast and west of 
modern Nigeria.  The large number of rivers in the area created a rugged terrain that 
provided natural defenses for the small states.  As a result, the states remained relatively 
safe from expanding neighbors, but were also unlikely to increase their own geographic 
area either.45 
Colonial Nigeria 
Despite the numerous pre-colonial political divisions among the people in the 
British colony of Nigeria, the British colonial administration in Nigeria saw three distinct 
geographical regions separating the three major linguistic groups as lines of ‘natural 
division.’  Based on these divisions, the British created a colony (northern Nigeria) and 
two protectorates (western and eastern Nigeria) and unified them under one colonial 
administration in 1914.  The British division of Nigeria along these lines created three 
unequally sized regions both in terms of size and population.  In 1953, the northern 
region was the largest including 56% of the colony’s population and two thirds of the 
physical area of Nigeria.46 The British realized uniting these different regions would 
weaken feelings of nationalism within Nigeria.  The fragmentary effects of regionalism 
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made a unified opposition to British colonial rule difficult to organize, and was an 
intended consequence of British colonial policy.47 Though it was likely an unintentional 
consequence, the creation of strong regional identities within Nigeria laid the foundations 
for the future power struggles in the newly created Nigerian democratic state.   
Politically, according to Larry Diamond, there were two distinct Nigerias, one in 
the north and one in the south.  Indirect rule worked well in the autocratic north, and the 
British allowed the emirs to continue to practice Islamic law, and speak the Hausa 
language as the official language of the northern Nigeria.48 The ruling emirs retained 
their hereditary power throughout the north and prevented the establishment of any 
competing political rivalries based on merit or abilities.  One third of the northern 
population did not speak the Hausa or Fulani languages and settled primarily in the 
Middle Belt region of the north.  The majority of this group was not Muslim, and resisted 
the autocracy of the northern emirs.  According to the 1953 census, southern Nigeria was 
divided along the majority Yoruba and Igbo speaking lines.  The western (majority 
Yoruba speaking) region contained 20% of the population, and the eastern (Igbo 
speaking) region contained 26%, and each retained about one sixth of the remaining 
Nigerian land mass.  Due to the limited effectiveness of chiefs in these areas, the British 
governed the south more directly.  Direct rule led to the adoption of English as the 
official language of the south.   Additionally, the British encouraged missionaries in 
southern Nigeria, which led to the widespread acceptance of Christianity in the region.  
Another result of direct rule and weak traditional leaders was the introduction of an 
elected government in the southern regions twenty-five years earlier than in the north.         
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Education was another difference between north and south in Nigeria.  Education 
was one significant path for Nigerians to increase their social status within society.  As a 
result of missionary influences in the west and east of Nigeria, and the restriction of 
missionary presence in the north, a great disparity in literacy rates developed between the 
north and south.  The average literacy rate in the 1950s in eastern and western Nigeria 
was around 17% and in the north it was a mere 1.4%.  This became a significant 
difference in Nigeria as they approached independence in the 1950s.  The official 
language in the Nigerian government was English, and therefore Nigerians from the 
south were disproportionately represented in the colonial government.49 
Post-colonial Nigeria 
During the British transition Nigeria from a colony to an independent nation in 
1950, Nigerian political leaders met in Ibadan for the General Constitution Conference.  
In this conference, the leaders reinforced the regional structure of the Nigerian 
government and demanded greater autonomy among the three regions.  In this system, 
the regions would delegate certain functions to the federal government and retain the 
remainder for their own administration.50 The maintenance of the redundant systems 
within Nigeria worked well in the early 1950s until agricultural prices for groundnuts in 
the north and cocoa in the west began to fall.  As the regions gradually lost their 
individual sources of revenue, they began to look increasingly to the federal government 
for assistance.  This dependence on the federal government weakened the regional 
governments and increased the importance of the federal government.  Due to the larger 
percentage of northern leaders in the federal government, the rise of the federal 
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government resulted in an increase in the power for the northern region in Nigerian 
politics.51 The increasing political and economic value associated with the control of the 
federal government resulted in greater efforts by the north to maintain its position.  
Northern attempts to retain control through all means available led to claims of northern 
census manipulation in 1962-1963 by the southern politicians.  Within the north, minority 
parties accused the leading political party, the Northern People’s Congress, of election 
manipulation.52 The move from regional to federal governmental control in Nigeria 
highlighted the inequality of the British conceived constitution and increased the 
competition among Nigeria’s three regions.  This competition set the stage for the two 
military coups of 1966 and the secession of the eastern region in 1967. 
The generalization made by the British and adopted by much of the western world 
that Nigeria was historically comprised of three major ethnic groups - Hausa-Fulani, 
Yoruba, and Igbo - is incorrect.  More accurately the British colony in Nigeria created 
three regional political groupings among people who shared similar linguistic features in 
the three colonial administrative regions.  The British generalization received little 
criticism during and after the colonial period because it was easy to understand and fit 
nicely into well defined geographic boundaries and accounted for a large number of 
Nigerian people.  While there were arguably similarities of religion, and political 
formations within the regions, translating regional similarities with regional ethnicities or 
state creation is historically inaccurate.  Further compounding the believability of the 
British ethnicity construction is the continued use of the three major political and 
language groupings by Nigerian politicians during the post-colonial period.  Like the 
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British colonial government, Nigerian politicians realized that language is an easy way of 
uniting diverse people into a politically significant constituency.  The events leading up 
to and throughout the Nigerian Civil War serve as a prime example of how political 
leaders in Nigeria emphasized ethnic tensions in Nigeria as a means to rally regional 
support and to cover their otherwise naked pursuit of political control.53
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IV The Nigerian Military Coups of 1966 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To outside observers the Nigerian federal system of government appeared to work for the 
new nation with only a few minor controversies.  The three major political parties shared 
governmental control, though at the expense of the minority linguistic groups contained 
within each, and the political and military situation appeared stable from the outside.  
Two coups in January and July 1966 shattered this peaceful appearance.  These two 
coups were led by the military using the promise to rid the nation of corrupt politicians as 
a cover for their actions, but both were struggles among regional political groups to 
control the government.  In both cases senior, and allegedly uninvolved, military leaders 
assumed control after both coups and established military governments.   
The Major’s Coup 
On January 15, 1966, a small group of young, Igbo army majors, led the first 
Nigerian coup, dubbed “the Major’s Coup.”  These British Military Academy trained 
officers were the elite core of the Nigerian professional army.  They saw the growing 
power of northern politicians as a threat to southern Nigeria and the eastern region in 
particular.  Their coup unsuccessfully attempted to seize control of the Nigerian 
government.  Their stated goal was to rid the government of the corrupt civilian 
administrators, end the perceived northern bias within the government, and initiate a 
corrective regime led by a military government.54 While it is possible the majors’ 
motivation was political reform, the lasting result of the coup was the assassination of 
seven senior army officers (four from the north, two from the west, one from the mid-
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west, and none from the east) leaving eastern born officers to assume the majority of the 
vacant positions.55 Historians disagree on the reasons for the coup and its motivations, 
but there is strong evidence to suggest that regionalism played the central role in the 
coup.56 Further ‘proof’ of the regional motivation of the coup was an Igbo power grab.  
The death of the two top (northern) politicians; and the deaths of four senior northern 
military officers, one high ranking western officer, and only one Igbo officer.  
Additionally, the one region where the coup failed completely was in the east.  De St. 
Jorre argues that this was probably due to the fact that the organizers of the coup focused 
less in the east; a region they believed would sympathize with their cause.57 
Historians also disagree about the involvement of Major General Ironsi in the 
coup.  Though he was an easterner, Luckham believes that Ironsi’s direct involvement 
was unlikely.  Luckham believed that Ironsi could have known about the coup, but was 
not part of the conspiracy.  Most likely, he watched the development of the coup, and 
took advantage of the situation to seize control of the government in the power vacuum 
that followed the execution of Nigerian Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and the removal 
of President Nnamdi Azikiwe.58 
As the new head of the Nigerian military government, Ironsi appointed regional 
government leaders based on regional identities rather than military seniority.  Though 
this move may have quieted the complaints of regional bias from the three largest 
political groups in Nigeria, the smaller and under-represented groups soon demanded a 
stronger centralized government where they could have more of a voice in the 
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government.59 Ironsi agreed with the need for a stronger central government, and 
believed regionalism was a force of division and conflict within Nigeria.  He made the 
elimination of regionalism in Nigeria a top priority of his government, speaking against it 
weeks after assuming power.60 Hausa-Fulanis of northern Nigeria saw the move away 
from a federal system of government as a threat to their power base.  They feared that a 
centralized government would employ the most educated members of Nigerian society in 
many of the powerful and lucrative administrative positions.  As a group, the north lacked 
the education of the south and would, therefore, hold fewer of these positions requiring 
higher average literacy levels.61 
When Ironsi eliminated Nigeria’s federal system of government in Decree #34 
riots ensued in the north.  In addition to Northerners’ fears that they could not compete 
with the south in a unified political system, they saw this decree as further proof of the 
Igbos power grab.62 Compounding these fears was the apparent lack of punishment 
meted out against the leaders of the Major’s Coup by Ironsi’s government.  Months after 
the coup, Ironsi had imprisoned the majors but had done little else to punish them.  
Critics pointed out that Ironsi had not even revoked the majors’ military rank.  Ironsi’s 
opponents found further evidence of his Igbo favoritism when he promoted twelve 
officers from major to lieutenant colonel, and eight of them were Igbos.  This was most 
likely not a politically motivated selection of Igbos over other officers from other groups, 
but rather, these officers were the next in line for promotion and reflected the 
 
59 Ibid., 52-3. 
60 Ibid., 54. 
61 Ibid., 58. 
62 Ibid., 59. 
29 
preponderance of Igbo officers in the Nigerian army prior to the civil war.63 In this 
period of heightened regional sensitivity, however, this inequality proved deadly.   
The Lieutenant’s Coup 
On July 29, 1966, junior officers and non-commissioned officers from the north 
led a second military coup and assassinated General Ironsi and other Igbo officers.  Robin 
Luckham believed a number of regionally related factors precipitated this second coup 
including: the failure of General Ironsi’s government to punish the “January majors” 
from the January 1966 coup, the decreased distance between junior and senior military 
officers after the loss of so many mid-level officers in the January coup, the inequity of 
command positions given to officers of eastern descent, and the fear that Ironsi’s decree 
#34 would increase the north’s isolation from power.64 This coup succeeded in removing 
many eastern officers from their positions in the army, and put the entire north and 
southwestern region of Nigeria under new military control.  The southeastern region 
remained in the hands of the previous military governor, Lieutenant colonel Emeka 
Ojukwu.  The coup leaders asked 31-year-old Lieutenant colonel Yakubu Gowon, the 
highest-ranking northern officer in the army, to lead the new government.  Hard-line 
northerners wanted Murtala Mohammed to lead the new government.  Mohammed and 
his supporters saw little advantage for Nigerian unity and desired a “de facto secession of 
the North from Nigeria.”65 Despite their wishes, Gowon assumed control of the new 
government.  Gowon appealed to many moderate northerners because he was not an Igbo 
and wanted to maintain Nigerian unity.  To the southerners, Gowon’s more moderate 
 
63 Ibid., 55. 
64 Ibid., 57-58. 
65 Ibid., 67. 
30 
political position and regional identity as a member of a minority middle belt group made 
him the leader most likely to end the violence and restore order to the nation.66 
Gowon and Ojukwu Compared 
The personalities of Ojukwu and Gowon are particularly important to the 
discussion of the Nigerian Civil War.  Their personalities and background help explain 
how each approached the growing regional conflict in Nigeria.  In 1966, Ojukwu was a 
33-year-old Igbo and was the military governor of the eastern region.  He was born in the 
north.  Ojukwu like many other Igbos was a Catholic.  He graduated from Oxford 
University and received his military training at Eaton Hall in England.  De St. Jorre 
described him as an intelligent, clever and self-confident man.67 Unlike other Nigerian 
officers who saw service in the military as a way to increase their personal wealth and 
social standing in Nigerian society, Luckham speculated that Ojukwu joined the military 
for political reasons.68 In contrast, Gowon was born the son of a Christian minister in the 
Middle Belt of Nigeria from a minority group known as Angas.  Gowon was a Sandhurst 
trained officer who De St. Jorre described as having “an abiding love for the military.”  
De St. Jorre also commented that Gowon appeared too immature to preside of a nation of 
50 million people, but his understanding of how the Nigerian military worked and his 
willingness to accept advice from others provided him with the ability to govern.69 
Arguably Ojukwu’s self-confidence and political ambitions and Gowon’s straight-laced 
military outlook ultimately impacted the way each man approached the war.  Gowon 
seemed ill prepared initially to confront the more politically savvy Ojukwu and Ojukwu 
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took advantage of his superior skills as a negotiator and diplomat.  Ojukwu’s confidence 
and political ambitions would ultimately cause his downfall as he placed his desire to 
govern ahead of the survival of the Igbo people.   
The Road to Biafran Secession 
By the end of August 1966 Gowon was the recognized head of the Nigerian 
government throughout the country except Ojukwu’s eastern region.  His first 
governmental priority was to restore order in Nigeria.  To make this happen, Gowon 
called for an “Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference” in Lagos where political leaders 
representing every region in Nigeria would identify the future structure of Nigeria’s 
political system.  Gowon identified four different structural options for the new Nigerian 
government, two of the options called for a federal system with a strong or weak central 
government, the third option was a confederacy, and the fourth option was a system 
entirely unique to Nigeria’s structure and composition.  Despite calls for secession, 
political leaders throughout Nigeria saw many problems in a confederate form of 
government including the coordination of separate militaries, police, and national revenue 
sharing.  Nigerians also received some pressure from British and American diplomats 
who favored the maintenance of the federation.  Before the members of the conference 
could reach any decision, anti-Igbo violence flared again in northern Nigeria on 
September 19, 1966.  The government did not sanction the violence, but did little to stop 
it.  John de St. Jorre points to official radio broadcasts in Kaduna of the alleged murder of 
northerners in the east as evidence of governmental encouragement of the massacre of 
easterners in the north. 70 Though official numbers varied based on their source from 
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seven thousand to fifty thousand dead in the massacres, de St. Jorre believed that the 
actual number killed was around ten thousand.71 
Ojukwu used these killings to consolidate his position in the east and called for 
the expulsion of all non-easterners from his region.  At the same time, easterners and 
particularly Igbos fled the north for the safety of Ojukwu’s eastern region.  Ojukwu, who 
had never recognized Gowon’s position as head of the Nigerian government or Gowon’s 
superior position in the military, was setting the stage for a political and potentially 
military confrontation.72 In October 1966 Nigerians had evidence of Ojukwu’s 
preparations to secede by force when they received a report that an airplane overloaded 
with weapons crashed in Cameroon enroute to eastern Nigeria.  Gowon likewise made his 
stand on secession clear when he announced his willingness to maintain the unity of 
Nigeria’s current boundaries by force.73 
In January 1967, Nigerian regional leaders met in Aburi, Ghana to settle their 
political differences.  Ojukwu saw this as an opportunity to gain constitutional provisions 
that would legitimize the increased autonomy of the east.  Gowon and the other regional 
military leaders naively saw this meeting as a chance to open a dialog among like-minded 
military men who, without the interference of civilian politicians, could resolve the 
growing crisis.  Gowon agreed to most of Ojukwu’s requests for increased autonomy for 
the regions within Nigeria and essentially a confederate system of administration.  He 
also agreed to accept the less powerful title as Commander-in-Chief of the military 
instead of the Supreme Commander of a unified Nigerian military.  Gowon had adopted 
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this more conciliatory position in hopes of placating the east and maintaining the unity of 
Nigeria.   
Ojukwu took advantage of Gowon’s position and publicly announced that 
Nigerian leaders had agreed to a weakening of the federation at the Aburi Conference as 
soon as he returned to eastern Nigeria.  Instead of unifying the nation, Gowon’s 
conciliatory position only strengthened Ojukwu’s position in the eastern region.  
Secessionist hawks saw this announcement as a confirmation of their ability to secede 
and the unity doves saw it as a way to maintain unity without full independence.74 
Gowon, obviously angered over Ojukwu’s announcement, responded by abandoning 
many of the conciliatory measures he had agreed to during the conference and reasserted 
himself as Supreme Commander of a unified Nigerian military.75 The breakdown 
following the Aburi Conference marked the last face-to-face meeting of the two leaders, 
and characterized the intractable positions of both men that would continue throughout 
the remainder of the secession crisis. 
Ojukwu announced on February 25, 1967 that unless the Nigerian government 
accepted the confederacy arrangement and implemented the terms of the Aburi 
agreement before March 31, 1967 he would implement them on his own.  Gowon 
responded by calling a supreme military council meeting on March 10, 1967 in Benin.  
Ojukwu declined the invitations to the meeting.  In his absence, the council enacted 
Gowon’s Decree #8 that declared the Nigeria’s new governmental organization would be 
a federal system with a weak central government.  Gowon saw this decree as an 
acceptable compromise between the Aburi agreement’s confederacy and northern hard-
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liner’s federal system with a strong central government.76 Ojukwu refused to accept the 
decree, but stopped short of calling for immediate secession when asked by the foreign 
press corps.  On March 31, 1967, Ojukwu still did not call for secession, but 
‘regionalized’ key infrastructure nodes in the east including railways and ports.77 
Throughout the spring of 1967 secession seemed imminent in eastern Nigeria as Ojukwu 
issued a number of “survival edicts” putting formerly federally controlled assets into 
exclusive control of eastern hands.  Gowon countered these moves with a blockade of the 
eastern region by land and sea.  On May 27, 1967 Ojukwu finally announced the 
secession of the eastern region from Nigeria and proclaimed the independent Republic of 
Biafra.78 
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V The Nigerian Civil War 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Nigerian Civil War lasted from May 27, 1967 until January 12, 1970.  Though the 
ultimate resolution of the war came from the actions of the two militaries, the diplomatic 
fight for international involvement in the conflict and the propaganda war waged by both 
sides prolonged the outcome of the war and had a profound impact on the way the U.S. 
approached its involvement.  Nigeria and Biafra maintained different strategies 
throughout the conflict.  The Federal Military Government (FMG) pursued a traditional 
military approach to force the break away east into the federation.  The Biafrans realized 
from the outset of the war that their best hope for independence would come from an 
international recognition and an internationally enforced peace settlement.  Though the 
Biafran secession was ultimately unsuccessful, their propaganda and their ability to gain 
some international recognition prolonged the conflict beyond the expectations of many 
outside observers.  The description of the war in the following pages will chronologically 
trace the success and failures of the two approaches to the war, and discuss the major 
developments for both sides. 
Prior to Nigerian Independence 70% of the officers in the Nigerian military were 
British, of the original 57 Nigerian officers only 23 were serving or alive in May 1967.  
Five of these 23 served under Gowon and the remaining eighteen under Ojukwu.79 By 
January 1966, the military included 9,000 soldiers and 350 officers.80 Of these 350, 17 
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were lieutenant colonels or above.81 Seven of these senior officers died in the January 
coup, and 39 others died and 23 were missing after the July 1966 coup.82 As a result, 
there was a significant lack of experienced leadership for both the Nigerian and Biafran 
armies at the start of the war.  These inexperienced officers led equally inexperienced 
soldiers whose numbers totaled approximately 7,000 men on each side.  Compounding 
the disadvantages of their inexperienced officers and soldiers, the Nigerian army had 
limited equipment, only light armored cars, a few personnel carriers, and no tanks.  The 
Nigerian navy had 6 small vessels to blockade two hundred miles of eastern Nigerian 
coastline.  The Nigerian air force had no bombing or fighter capabilities at the beginning 
of the war.  The Biafran military had similar equipment shortages but could boast 2, 
twenty-five year old, B-26 bombers and 6 French-made helicopters.83 
The “Phony War” 
Ojukwu officially announced the secession of Biafra from Nigeria on May 27, 
1967.  The Nigerian Civil War lasted approximately thirty-one months; during the 
majority of the war, the two sides did little actual fighting.  The war was essentially a 
Nigerian siege of Biafra with brief periods of offensive actions by both sides.  The lack of 
fighting was evident in the first two months of the conflict.  John St. de Jorre called the 
first two months after Biafra seceded from Nigeria the “Phony War” because there was 
only political posturing and no actual fighting between the two sides.  Biafra and Nigeria 
were both waiting to see how the other would react, and both were rapidly recruiting and 
training their armies for eventual conflict.  At the end of June and the beginning of July 
1967 the Federal Military Government in Nigeria reached out to its allies in Great Britain 
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and the United States for military equipment and munitions sales.  Both Great Britain and 
the United States turned down these requests for military equipment assistance to the 
consternation of Nigerian officials.84 Nigerians were confused with the U.S. reasoning 
for their withholding of critical war materials.  Some initially believed that the U.S. 
government did not approve of Gowon as head of the FMG.  The U.S. State Department 
repeated its position in a series of telegrams from Washington to its embassy in Lagos 
that the Nigerian Civil War was an internal problem and that they were not going to get 
involved.  Nigerians pointed to U.S. support for the Congo during the Katangan Crisis in 
1961-1962 where U.S. aircraft were given to prevent the break up of the Congo.  The 
U.S. reply to these charges was that the Katangan situation was different because the 
Katanga crisis involved non-Congolese third party governments who wanted to destroy 
the Congo.  The U.S. government saw the Katangan Crisis as an invasion of a sovereign 
nation by foreign powers.  The Nigerian Civil War was, by definition, an internal war, 
and the U.S. respected the sovereignty of Nigeria.  They further stated that the U.S. did 
not interfere in internal political disputes.85 
Throughout the Nigerian Civil War, the primary goal of the Biafran leadership 
was to receive international recognition of Biafran independence from Nigeria.  Such 
recognition would allow the lawful intervention by third parties to negotiate a peace 
between the two sides.86 One of the earliest attempts at garnering such recognition 
occurred during the Phony War period.  In this case, Ojukwu claimed the right to receive 
the oil royalties for the oil extracted from inside their borders by foreign oil companies.  
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He gave foreign companies a deadline of July 10, 1967 to send their payments to his 
government or he would suspend oil shipments from Biafra.87 Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, France, and the United States all had oil interests in Nigerian and Biafran oil 
fields.  The leading oil producing company in Nigeria and Biafra was the British owned 
Shell/BP and therefore the rest of the involved nations looked towards the British 
reaction to the Biafran demand before they would commit to any payments.  The British 
government refused to pay royalties to the Biafrans since they did not acknowledge 
Biafra’s independence.  The British government’s approval for any payments was 
significant as they held a 49% interest in the company.  Despite this controlling interest, 
Shell/BP officials agreed to a “token payment of £250,000”88 to Biafra on the day of the 
deadline.  The British High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir David Hunt, was furious at 
Shell/BP’s payment without seeking the government’s approval.  Despite the British 
disapproval, the British Commonwealth Secretary of State George Thomas approved of 
the payment while telling the Nigerian government that their actions did not amount to 
official recognition of Biafra.  At the same time, Thomas criticized the Nigerians for 
preventing oil tankers from leaving eastern Nigerian ports.  The Nigerians remained 
skeptical about the British motives for sanctioning the payment, and refused to lift the 
naval blockade.  This was to be the last battle of the Phony War, and actual armed 
conflict began five days later on July 6, 1967.89 
The “Shooting War” Begins 
It is unclear whether the fighting occurred at this time due to FMG fears of 
growing Biafran support within the international community or simply because Nigeria’s 
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military was finally prepared to attack.  De St. Jorre believed that the Nigerians planned 
their attack for July 7th and that a border skirmish the day before caused the change to the 
timeline.  U.S. Embassy sources indicated that the Biafran defensive perimeter repulsed 
the initial Nigerian offensives.90 The telegram did not indicate any surprise at the 
Biafran’s military abilities by the U.S. government.  A previous memorandum sent to 
Washington reflected the old British stereotypes about the military characteristics 
dominant in particular Nigerian groups.  The memorandum described northerners as 
better soldiers because they came from a more authoritarian tradition where people were 
used to obeying orders from superiors without question.  While easterners and Igbos in 
particular, were more intelligent but lacked the courage of the northern fighters.91 The 
U.S. Embassy in Lagos explained to the Secretary of State that this was a long held belief 
among the British during the colonial period.  Though they tended to discredit the idea as 
a biased generalization, they still included it in their assessment of the current military 
situation in Nigeria.  This indicated how little independent intelligence the United States 
possessed at the time about Nigeria, and how reliant they were on British intelligence 
summaries.  The U.S. increasingly replaced the British lead in ensuring the post-colonial 
territorial integrity of African nations, but they still relied heavily on British models and 
policy to guide their decisions.  The Biafran resistance was short lived in the areas of 
initial fighting.  FMG forces occupied the towns of Ogoja, Nsukka, and Bonny Island 
within the first twenty days of fighting.  These victories were both symbolically and 
strategically significant to the war.  Igbos saw Nsukka as the heart of traditional Igboland, 
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and Bonny Island was the major oil terminal and largest potential source of revenue in 
Biafra.92 
Biafran Counter-Attack 
FMG victories did not seem to affect the Biafran military or their leadership’s 
continued willingness to fight.  Despite the presence of Nigerian forces in the north and 
south of their country, Ojukwu decided to launch its own offensive into the mid-west 
region on August 9th.93 The mid-west had long supported the Nigerian federal system 
and saw their region as a microcosm of Nigeria.  The mid-west had numerous small 
political groups within it, and their government shared power without the ‘ethnic’ 
tensions present in the other regions.  Brigadier General David Ejoor, the military 
governor of the Mid-West region attempted to remain neutral at the beginning of the 
conflict while supporting the concept of a unified Nigeria.  Ojukwu did not attack the 
mid-west because of its pro-unity position, because he believed that he could turn the war 
into a north versus south conflict.  Ojukwu believed that he was “liberating” the mid-west 
from Nigerian domination.  From a practical point of view, the mid-west was lightly 
defended and did include many Igbos who were potentially sympathetic to Ojukwu’s 
cause.  These two factors allowed him to take the entire mid-west region including the 
cities of Benin, Sapele, Warri, and Ughelli with an ‘army’ of one thousand poorly trained 
soldiers and almost no shots fired.94 The FMG forces finally halted the Biafran offensive 
on the outskirts of Ore on the eastern border of the western region.  Nigerian forces 
blocked the Biafran entrance to Ore with the destruction of two bridges into the city. 95 
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Stopping the Biafran offensive into Ore turned the tide of the war in Nigeria’s favor.  
From that point on, the Biafrans never mounted a significant offensive or threatened the 
boundaries of Nigeria.  The resulting FMG counter-offensive succeeded in capturing the 
Biafran capital city of Enugu and the coastal city of Calabar in the first two weeks of 
October 1967.96 
Historians cite several reasons for Ojukwu’s short-lived campaign in the mid-
west, the obvious ones were their lack of trained soldiers, weapons, and small numbers 
compared to the Nigerian army.  Additionally, though there were Igbo speakers in the 
mid-western region, the majority of mid-westerners did not see the Biafran invasion as a 
liberating movement.  Non-Igbos did not want ‘liberation’ from the Nigerian federation 
or the subsequent “cultural extinction they would face under the Igbos.”97 Ojukwu’s 
attack into the west caught the FMG by surprise, though this surprise was the key to the 
initial Biafran military success, it also opened a third front in the war.  De St. Jorre 
described this offensive as typical of Ojukwu’s preference of tactical victories in lieu of 
more long lasting strategic ones.98 This is possible because Ojukwu believed that quick 
and decisive Biafran successes would win him the international recognition that was so 
vital to Biafra’s cause.  He knew that Biafra’s best chance at a lasting independence could 
not come from the force of arms.  Eventually the size and numeric advantages of Nigeria 
would overwhelm the Biafrans.  By gaining international recognition as an independent 
nation would allow him to call for UN peacekeepers or overt foreign military support to 
protect his borders.  Without this support, Biafran independence was doomed. 
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The Diplomatic War 
Breaking the united support of the OAU states for Nigeria became one of the first 
priorities of Ojukwu’s government at the time of the Biafran secession.  He realized the 
OAU’s support would be difficult to win based on the six founding principles of the 
organization adopted at the first pan-African summit in May 1963.  At this meeting, all of 
the attending states agreed on the following: (1) equality of all states regardless of size, 
(2) non-interference in internal problems of member states, (3) respect for international 
boundaries, (4) seek peaceful solutions to disputes between states, (5) cooperation in 
African development, and (6) dedication to seeking independence for the remaining 
African colonies.99 Based on these principles, Gowon and the FMG never seriously 
considered any OAU involvement or resolution against their side.100 Ojukwu was not 
convinced of the solidarity within the OAU.  He attempted to fracture the OAU solidarity 
and sent envoys to the East African Summit on July 6, 1967.  These Biafran diplomats 
were partially successful persuading member states at the summit of the need for OAU 
intervention in Nigeria.  Both the Tanzania and Zambia delegations voted in favor of 
supporting the Biafrans.  Kenya and Uganda (who had potentially similar ‘ethnic’ 
conflicts within their own boundaries) cautioned against taking sides in Nigeria’s internal 
conflict.101 
Though the Biafrans received no formal support for their cause at this summit, 
other diplomatic efforts by the Biafrans persuaded Mobutu to suggest adding Biafran 
secession to the agenda of the Kinshasa meeting of the OAU in September 1967.  
Nigerian officials feared that allowing Biafra to have a voice in the OAU would amount 
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to international recognition of Biafran independence.  Legitimizing Biafra might lead to 
the Nigerian’s greatest fear, the recognition of Biafra by the United States.  The United 
States had already turned down Nigerian requests to purchase American arms, and was 
becoming nervous about Nigerian arms deals made with the Soviets.102 Due to behind 
the scenes negotiations by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, Nigerian fears of Biafran 
recognition at the Kinshasa meeting were relieved when the group agreed to respect 
Nigeria’s sovereignty and allow them to handle the secession crisis internally.103 
Historian Raph Uwechue criticized the OAU for treating the Nigerian Civil War as a 
minor issue at the Kinshasa conference, and cited this as evidence of the OAU’s lack of 
will to do more than rubber stamp any member state’s actions.104 Though Biafra did not 
get a seat at the table or a chance to voice their complaints before the OAU, Ojukwu saw 
the heated debate surrounding Biafran participation as a victory and sign that many 
leaders saw the war as an African issue, not just a Nigerian one.105 
As an alternative to OAU involvement in the Nigerian Civil War, Six African 
heads of state present at the Kinshasa summit formed the OAU Consultative Committee 
to help Nigeria negotiate an end to the war with Biafra.  The members of the committee 
included Joseph Mobutu of the Congo, William Tubman of Liberia, Joseph Ankrah of 
Ghana, Ahmaou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Hamani Diori of Niger, and Haile Selassie of 
Ethiopia.  They planned to travel to Nigeria immediately following the summit.  Despite 
delays, the group eventually arrived in Nigeria and offered to assist the Nigerian 
government.  Biafran propaganda announced the group was coming to negotiate a peace 
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between the two sides.  The committee silenced these rumors when they declared their 
support of Nigeria and called for the renouncement of secession in eastern Nigeria and 
the east’s acceptance of the FMG.106 Uwechue further highlighted the fact that the OAU 
Consultative Committee did not visit Biafra during their first official trip to Nigeria as 
evidence of their lack willingness to take any action contrary to Nigerian desires.107 
The OAU Charter agreement of 1963, to preserve the territorial integrity of post-
colonial African states, ensured that the OAU would never play a significant role in 
settling the Nigerian Civil War.  They compromised their ability to play the role of 
peacemakers by taking sides from the start of the war.  Despite the inability of the OAU 
to broker an agreement between the two sides, the United States continued to rely on the 
OAU to resolve the crisis.  Raph Uwechue argued that African heads of state were 
concerned that support of Biafran independence would set a dangerous precedent for 
member states like Ethiopia, Sudan, Cameroon, Kenya, the Congo, and others.  He 
further criticized the OAU leaders, charging that they were more interested in not hurting 
one another’s feelings than solving any real African issues.108 Political scientist 
Emmanuel N. Amadife also believed that the OAU lacked the neutrality to resolve the 
Nigerian War in peace talks between both sides due to their public disapproval of 
secession.  He argued that the United States maintained their position that the Nigerian 
Civil War was an African problem that would be handled best by the OAU.  This policy 
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was especially easy to maintain early on in the war, as it appeared not to have “a Cold 
War dimension.”109 
Progress in the war continued more slowly in 1968.  The ever-shrinking perimeter 
of Biafra shortened the lines of communication and resupply for the Biafrans providing 
an advantage for the determined Biafrans against the overstretched Nigerian military.  
Gowon’s prediction of victory by March 1968 came and went with few results.  Though 
the Biafran army could not defeat the Nigerians in set piece battles, they were able to take 
advantages of localized numeric advantages and attack isolated Nigerian forces.  When 
the Nigerian army responded with coordinated attacks using artillery, mortars, and 
armored cars, the Biafrans simply faded into the countryside and out of contact.110 
In contrast to ineffectual Nigerian military attacks, Gowon struck a more serious 
blow to the Biafran economy and their ability to fund their arms purchases.  He achieved 
this by changing the Nigerian currency in January 1968.  This move forced the Biafrans 
to dump their Nigerian currency reserves on the international market for a fraction of its 
worth and left the Biafran government holding stacks of worthless outdated Nigerian 
currency.111 
International Recognition for Biafra 
Though staggering from military and economic pressure by the Nigerians, the 
Biafran diplomatic campaign won a tremendously important political victory in the 
spring of 1968.  Biafran foreign affairs officials saw international recognition by African 
nations of Biafra’s independence as critical to their efforts to persuade the United States 
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and France to support more openly their cause.  The U.S. deferred all Biafran requests for 
greater diplomatic involvement in the war to the OAU.  Biafran diplomats believed that if 
they could divide the OAU’s solidarity, they could show the U.S. that the OAU was 
incapable of negotiating a settlement without increased U.S. involvement.  Similarly, the 
French were reluctant to support overtly the Biafrans unless they believed Francophone 
African nations also supported Biafran independence.112 Based on these considerations, 
Biafran diplomatic efforts targeted Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Uganda, who despite their political differences had previously expressed concern over the 
starvation of Biafran women and children.   
The Biafran government opened an information office in Tanzania at the start of 
the war.  Tanzania and Zambia appeared likely to sympathize with the Biafran cause.  At 
this time neither nation faced significant secessionist movements within their own 
borders and therefore could support the Biafrans without encouraging similar conflicts at 
home.  Additionally, the anti-Igbo violence that preceded the war “seemed to confirm 
Nyerere’s and Kaunda’s deep suspicions about the viability and justice inherent in any 
federation that was a creation of imperial Britain.”113 The failure of Nyerere and 
Kaunda’s attempts to negotiate a settlement between the two sides prior to the war, and 
the failure of the OAU Consultative Committee to settle the conflict caused Nyerere to 
travel to Cote d’Ivoire to discuss diplomatic recognition with Houphouet-Boigny.   
Biafran diplomats saw support from Cote d’Ivoire as significant to their cause due 
to the size of its military, its economic strength in West Africa, and its close ties with 
France.  Biafrans believed Houphouet-Boigny might support their independence based on 
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his public stances against communism, his personal Catholic religious faith, and “the 
traditional fear among coastal West African leaders of Moslem domination from the 
northern hinterland.”114 Biafran diplomats also believed they might be able to appeal to 
Houphouet-Boigny’s desire to weaken Nigeria’s power in West Africa by dividing 
Nigeria’s oil producing region.  In addition to his discussions with Nyerere, Houphouet-
Boigny spoke with French officials during this time about recognition.  He eventually 
agreed to recognize Biafra, but believed an Anglophone African nation should be the first 
to recognize publicly Biafra to deflect any criticism of French or Francophone 
motivations to divide Nigeria.115 
Nyerere announced Tanzania’s recognition of Biafra on April 13, 1968 but Cote 
d’Ivoire waited for four weeks before making his own announcement.  International 
expectations of Houphouet-Boigny’s recognition increased when Gabon’s President 
Albert Bongo recognized Biafra on May 8, 1968.  This action was significant because of 
Bongo’s close association with Houphouet-Boigny.  Since Biafra had not sent any 
diplomats to Gabon to discuss recognition, it appeared likely that Houphouet-Boigny had 
influenced Bongo’s decision.  Houphouet-Boigny likely wanted another West African 
nation to recognize Biafra to further separate the involvement of the French influence on 
his decision.  One week later, Cote d’Ivoire announced its recognition of Biafra on May 
14, 1968.  Kaunda and Nyerere agreed that Tanzania would recognize Biafra and then 
Zambia would wait until a West African nation announced its recognition before Zambia 
would make its move.  They also agreed to have Zambia’s announcement coincide with 
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the Commonwealth peace talks in Uganda in order to improve the Biafran negotiation 
position with Nigeria.  On May 20, 1968 Zambia recognized Biafra.   
The four African recognitions failed to convince the French government or any 
African leaders to officially recognize Biafra.  The recognitions also failed improve 
Biafra’s bargaining position with the Nigerian government in future peace talks.  Though 
the four recognitions did not immediately internationalize the Nigerian Civil War, they 
did change the conditions of the debate on western non-intervention.  As long as the 
OAU remained united in their support for the continued unity of Nigeria, the U.S. could 
argue that Africans opposed intervention into the domestic affairs of African nations 
based on the 1963 OAU charter.  Once the united African front fractured, the U.S. 
position lost its credibility and forced the U.S. foreign policy makers to reevaluate their 
pro-Nigerian neutrality.116 
Political and Military Exploitation of Starvation 
Though the recognitions were important morale victories for Biafra, they only 
served to prolong the conflict.  As the war continued in the spring of 1968, the Nigerian 
blockade and the ever-decreasing boundaries of Biafra led to a massive refugee crisis and 
starvation within the region.  The effects of the military actions compounded the 
population and malnutrition issues that predated the war.  Eastern Nigeria had always 
been a highly populated area of Africa; at the time of the war it was the fourth populous 
region in Africa behind Rwanda, Burundi, and the Nile Valley.  The large population and 
the lack of high protein foodstuffs made a low level malnutrition a fact of life in Biafra.  
Adding to these natural problems, refugees from northern Nigeria prior to the war and 
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civilians fleeing the war’s frontlines concentrated the population even more making 
massive starvation inevitable.117 
In this war, starvation was more than a peripheral issue involving only civilians.  
Starvation was a central component of the military and political strategy of the two sides.  
Both sides believed the starvation of civilians would eventually result in an end of the 
war.  The Nigerians saw starvation as a weapon of war.  After months of indecisive 
military action, the Nigerian military leaders viewed starvation as a legitimate weapon 
against the Biafrans.  The blockade of the Biafrans made coordination and logistical 
operations difficult for the inexperienced Nigerian army.   If the Nigerians could not 
swiftly crush the Biafran resistance, they were confident they could out wait their 
opponents.118 The Biafrans recognized the power that images of starving women and 
children in their country had on public opinion.  As a result, they encouraged 
photographs, video footage, and news stories from the western media in hopes of winning 
sympathy and support from the international community.  As a result of Ojukwu’s over-
arching war aim to win international support and recognition of the legitimacy of their 
secession, propaganda was always a key aspect of the Biafran war effort.119 Both sides 
were correct in their belief in the power of starvation in the war.  Starvation greatly 
influenced the U.S. response to the war, and ultimately led to the collapse of the Biafran 
resistance. 
Ojukwu’s propaganda targeted both domestic and international populations with 
its messages.  The domestic message was simply that if Biafrans did not continue to fight 
the Nigerians, the victorious Nigerian army would kill all Igbos left in Biafra.  The 
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international propaganda played on similar themes of Nigerian violence against Igbos 
prior to the war and added photographs and news footage of the starving bodies of 
Biafran children.  The Biafrans hired public relations firms to spread these messages to 
the world with shocking effectiveness.  Mark Press owned by an American in 
Switzerland served as the main conduit of Biafran propaganda to the world.  Mark Press 
struggled to get its message into the international consciousness before the spring of 1968 
when the first photos of starving children appeared.120 
Gowon’s war plan did not originally include any propaganda aspect.  He wanted 
to wage a more conventional war and did not want to fight the war in the press.  Initially 
he resisted employing a public relations firm until the last year of the war.  His eventual 
decision to publicize his side of the war succeeded in countering the Biafran propaganda. 
Pro-Nigerian press releases gained important credibility by the multiple reports written 
by a UN observer team including representatives from Great Britain, Canada, Poland, and 
OAU members.121 Though the team never entered Biafran territory, over the course of 
sixteen months the team regularly sent reports from newly-occupied Nigerian territory to 
the United Nations.  In every report, the team repeatedly denied any evidence of genocide 
or mistreatment of eastern refugees by the Nigerian military.   
In the spring of 1968, however, only Biafran propaganda began to reach sectors of 
the American public.  The stories elicited popular outcries against the United States’ pro-
Nigerian neutrality grew louder from special interest groups, relief agencies, and 
members of Congress.  These groups demanded some intervention by the U.S. into the 
conflict to stop the growing humanitarian disaster.  The number of newspaper articles in 
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the New York Times increased from a pre-war average between January 1966 and June 
1967 of 9 articles per month to 19 articles per month from July 1967 to June 1968.  That 
number more than doubled in July 1968 and nearly quadrupled in August 1968.122 
Despite these calls for action, the Johnson Administration refused to do more than attach 
greater emphasis on the OAU consultative committee peace talks in Kampala (May 23-
31, 1968) and in Niamey (July 15-26, 1968).  In a written address to the OAU Summit in 
Algiers on September 13, 1968, Johnson reiterated his support for an OAU resolution.  
He told the members of the summit, “It is you -- the Assembly of the OAU as the 
conscience of Africa --that the world now looks to break that Nigerian deadlock.”123 
Given the U.S. desires for an OAU solution, historian Amadife pointed to Johnson’s 
written message delivered at the OAU Summit in Algiers (September 13, 1968) as 
evidence of the American president’s growing disenchantment with the OAU’s progress.  
According to Walt Rostow, the address was meant as a warning to the African leaders 
that unless they made progress, the United States would have no choice other than to 
become more involved.124 
Unfortunately for the Johnson Administration, neither round of peace talks 
resulted in any movement by either Gowon or Ojukwu towards reconciliation.  Both sides 
believed that they could still win the war without compromising on the central issue of 
independence.  Recent Nigerian military success against the Biafrans in the Rivers State 
prevented Gowon from accepting any proposal that did not include the full re-integration 
of Biafra into Nigeria.  At the same time, official recognition of Biafra by four African 
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states hardened Ojukwu’s resolve.  Ojukwu believed negotiations would discourage other 
nations from recognizing Biafra’s independence. Thus the two conferences resulted in no 
change to Nigeria, Biafra, or the OAU’s negotiating position and further illustrated the 
unlikelihood that the OAU was capable of negotiating any sort of agreement.125 
The Civil War’s Second Year  
Militarily, the war also progressed slowly despite Gowon announcement of the 
army’s ‘final offensive’ in August 1968.  In addition to the logistical and training issues 
that hindered the Nigerian’s progress, the leaders of the Army’s three divisions were also 
divided.  The commanding generals of the three Nigerian army divisions competed 
against each other for the political spotlight and over the limited number of supplies and 
soldiers instead of coordinating their efforts against the Biafran forces.  De St. Jorre 
described the three men as competent and experienced leaders, trained by the British at 
Sandhurst (the British Military Academy).  Their biggest obstacle was that they lacked 
the trained armies with whom Sandhurst officers assumed they would use to fight British 
wars.126 The Nigerian generals also lacked trained junior officers to lead the soldiers.  
Many of the former Nigerian officers had returned to their homes in Biafra prior to the 
war or died in the assassinations of 1966.  Even without these problems, the increased 
size of the Nigerian army greatly exceeded the number of trained officers in Nigeria’s 
peacetime army.  As a result, the Nigerian army failed to coordinate Gowon’s final 
assault, with one of the three divisions blatantly defying Gowon’s order by failing to 
move from their defensive positions.  Thus the final assault remained yet another failed 
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attempt by the FMG to defeat the Biafrans, and the war would drag on for another year 
and a half.127 
Diplomatically and militarily the war stagnated, but Biafran propaganda efforts 
finally began to gain the United States public’s attention.  By summer’s end in 1968, 
images from the Nigerian Civil War made their way into the homes of average 
Americans in Life magazine and on their televisions.128 This mainstream coverage of the 
humanitarian crisis increased the U.S. public’s concern over their nation’s position on the 
war.  This growing concern was not lost on Republican presidential candidate Richard 
Nixon; in two separate campaign speeches he mentioned the Nigerian Civil War.  In 
these speeches, Nixon criticized the Johnson administration for their handling of the 
Nigerian crisis and vowed to review the U.S. position on the war if he was elected.  
President Johnson was guilty of neglecting African affairs.  Roger Morris explained that 
the Cold War had a brief appearance in the early 1960’s in the Congo.  It had become 
increasingly clear to the U.S.; however, that Soviet and Chinese interest in the continent 
had waned.  This realization allowed President Johnson to discount the importance of 
African affairs for much of his presidency in favor of African-American civil rights and 
the Vietnam War.129 The Nigerian Civil War was no exception to this rule.  Johnson paid 
little attention to Nigeria throughout 1967, but apparently the constant pictures from 
Biafra eventually drew his attention as well.  Johnson saw the Nigerian Civil War as a 
distraction from other more important items on his personal agenda.  The President’s lack 
of sincere concern for the Biafrans as well as his acknowledgement of the increasing 
domestic pressure on his administration caused by the Biafran media campaign was 
 
127 Ibid., 266-267. 
128 Thompson, American Policy and African Famine, 63. 
129 Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 17. 
54 
evident in his order in the late fall of 1967 to Under-Secretary of State Nicholas 
Katzenbach “to get those nigger babies off of my television set.”130 Despite his personal 
feelings, Johnson obviously saw the need to take some public action to placate the 
American public.  The Biafran propaganda won a small victory with the U.S. government 
and forced them to address the issue of the Nigerian Civil War.  Johnson’s creation of a 
Biafran relief task force marked the first time since the war began that the U.S. broke 
with British policy in Nigeria.  Until this point, the U.S. had followed Great Britain’s lead 
in the conflict.  Johnson’s administration no longer believed they could support a British 
policy whose basic premise was that aiding Biafran civilians “might cause few deaths but 
at the end save millions.”131 Despite the formation of the relief task force, the U.S. made 
no moves to intervene in the conflict outside of financially supporting various 
international relief organizations. 
The Civil War’s Final Year 
The OAU Consultative Committee met again in Monrovia in March and April 
1969 with similar results from their previous meetings.  Stremlau argued that Gowon felt 
the OAU’s involvement in Nigeria’s internal affairs was inappropriate, he realized as 
long as the OAU stayed engaged the United States would remain on the sidelines.  He 
knew the OAU would not be able to force a peace on either side of the war.  If involved, 
the U.S. would seek to end rapidly the humanitarian crisis by forcing a peace between the 
two sides.  At the same time Ojukwu realized that outside nations would not intervene 
unless they believed that Biafra’s cause was not completely lost.  As a result, Ojukwu 
launched a counter-offensive across the entire Biafran/Nigerian front.  Biafran forces 
 
130 Ibid., 42. 
131 Ibid., 42. 
55 
succeeded in retaking Owerri on April 25, 1969 from the Nigerians.  Ojukwu combined 
this military attack with Biafran mercenary air force strikes against mid-western oil 
facilities.  This was the second and last significant Biafran attempt to use military force to 
generate international support for his cause.  Despite their limited military successes 
against the Nigerians, attacks against the oil facilities and their western employees only 
served to alienate Biafra from the west.   
In October 1969, Gowon launched his final ‘final assault’ of the war.  This 
campaign unlike its predecessors was initiated with no formal announcement.  In the 
spring of that year, Gowon had grown tired of his army’s lack of progress and relieved all 
three of Nigeria’s division commanders.132 This move most likely had less effect on the 
conclusion of the war than the ever-worsening situation within Biafra.  By the fall of 
1969, the Biafran army was suffering from a lack of weapons, ammunition, food, and 
morale.  In January 1970, Biafran resistance simply melted away into the countryside as 
the Nigerian army advanced across the remainder of Biafran territory.  Ojukwu realized 
the war was over and his staff convinced him that he should leave Biafra so they could 
surrender.  He left Biafra on a relief plane on January 11, 1970 for the Cote d’Ivoire and 
his chief of staff Phillip Effiong made a radio announcement telling his soldiers to lay 
down their arms the next day.133 Even the Nigerians seemed surprised by the lack of 
Biafran resistance at the end of the war.  They appeared unprepared to assume control of 
the relief efforts in eastern Nigeria.  Despite this lack of preparation the Nigerians refused 
support from the religious relief agencies that they accused of prolonging Nigeria’s 
suffering. 
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VI LBJ and Nixon’s Nigerian Foreign Policy 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The preceding chapter focused on the Nigerian Civil War and the role of the international 
community in its resolution.  Based on this background, the following chapter will focus 
solely on the formulation of the Nixon Administration’s policy in the Nigerian Civil War 
in 1969.  In the course of this investigation we will see how the humanitarian crisis in 
Biafra forced the U.S. to change their role from neutral bystander to active participants in 
the resolution of the conflict.  As 1969 progressed, the Nixon Administration considered 
their foreign policy options in the Nigerian Civil War on four separate occasions.  The 
first was within the first two months of Nixon’s presidency, the second in late spring after 
months of continued military and diplomatic stalemate, the third was after the shooting of 
a Red Cross relief aircraft, and the fourth was after the Biafrans failed to agree to daylight 
relief flights. 
Key Figures in the Development of U.S./Nigerian Foreign Policy 
The four main characters in the formulation of the Nixon Administration’s 
position on the Nigerian Civil War were President Nixon, National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, William Rogers, and National Security Council 
African Affairs Specialist, Roger Morris.   
According to Stremlau, Shepard, and Morris’s accounts, President Nixon 
sympathized with the Biafran people.  Shepard believed Nixon was the only one in his 
Administration who favored supporting Biafra.134 He also indicated Nixon’s policy was 
strongly influenced by Henry Kissinger who “never shared Nixon’s enthusiasm for the 
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Biafran cause.”135 Even after Nixon told Kissinger he wanted to recognize Biafra, 
Kissinger simply ignored the President’s request.   Morris also described Nixon as weak 
and “wavering within himself”136 on the issue of the U.S. policy in the Nigerian Civil 
War.  In Kissinger’s book, The White House Years, he explained the motive behind 
Nixon’s support for the Biafrans as a way to put his opponents on the wrong side of a 
popular issue.137 
As previously described, Henry Kissinger had a great deal of influence over 
Nixon’s foreign policy decisions.  Morris described Kissinger’s role in certain foreign 
policy circumstances as the “defacto President.”138 As Shepard described, Kissinger 
never seemed interested in supporting Biafran independence.  Kissinger believed support 
for Nigeria was the best course of action for the “long-term interests” of the United 
States.139 Anecdotally, Kissinger’s decision to dedicate only two pages out of 1,476 in 
his book, The White House Years, to describing the Nigerian Civil War as an indication 
of his lack of interest in the conflict. 
Secretary of State William Rogers fully supported the Nigerian Federal Military 
Government.  He viewed any increased involvement by the Nixon Administration as 
interfering in Nigerian politics and internal affairs.  He believed the U.S. maintained no 
influence over either side in the war and any position other than the Johnson 
Administration’s pro-Nigerian neutrality would only result in greater Soviet 
involvement.140 
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Roger Morris acted as a foil to the State Department’s pro-Nigerian sentiment.  
He doggedly supported the Biafrans throughout the remainder of the war, injecting 
doubts about the Nigerian military’s ability to defeat the Biafrans in his memorandums to 
Kissinger.   The strength of his support for the Biafrans might have been motivated by his 
concern for their survival as a group.  Perhaps just as likely, his support for Biafra might 
have been motivated by his belief that the State Department’s support for Nigerian served 
its own goals (and not those of President Nixon).  Whatever his motivation, Morris 
played a large role in preventing the Nixon Administration from following the State 
Department’s desired foreign policy in Nigeria. 
The interaction of these four men and the actions of the American public shaped 
the Administration’s foreign policy in Nigeria through the course of 1969.  They also had 
to deal with the legacy of the Johnson Administration in the war prior to Nixon’s 
inauguration.   
Growing U.S. Concern over Biafran Starvation 
As described earlier, images of starving Biafran children made a significant 
impact on the American public’s interest in the civil war.  During the first year of the 
war, Americans showed little interest in the political situation in Nigeria.  As the 
humanitarian crisis grew in late 1968, Americans wanted their government to do 
something to stop the starvation of innocents in Biafra.  At the same time, the White 
House and the U.S. State Department did not want to alienate Gowon and the Nigerian 
government.  By the time the Nigerian Civil War became a mainstream issue with the 
U.S. public, President Johnson had already announced his decision not to run for re-
election.  As a result, Johnson did little to change the U.S. policy towards either side of 
the Nigerian Civil War.  Johnson was not immune to the mounting political pressure at 
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the end of his presidency in 1968.  This pressure led Johnson to the break from his 
administration’s policy of strict neutrality in the Nigerian Civil War.   
The most significant outcome of this political pressure was the sale of U.S. 
aircraft to international relief organizations.  In the fall of 1968 relief supporters had 
discovered the availability of surplus U.S. Air Force cargo planes suitable for conducting 
relief operations.  This group found support from Senator Ted Kennedy and House 
Speaker John McCormack for their plan to sell these aircraft to relief agencies.  Kennedy 
and McCormack then approached President Johnson with the plan.  In November 1968, 
Johnson asked his Secretaries of State and Defense to “explore the possibility of using C-
97”141 cargo planes in relief operations.  According to Emmanual Amadife, the 
Secretaries understood the President’s request as an order and sold eight surplus C-97G 
cargo planes to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and U.S. based 
relief organizations to support the airlift of relief supplies to the starving Biafran 
people.142 
Nixon made two campaign speeches in the summer of 1968 where he criticized 
the Johnson Administration’s failure to stop the growing humanitarian crisis in Nigeria 
and described them as doing little more than “wringing their hands” while civilians 
starved to death. He stated that “genocide is what is taking place right now--and 
starvation is the grim reaper.”143 He went on to say that, “America is not without 
enormous material wealth and power and ability.  There is no better cause in which we 
might invest that power than in saving lives of innocent men, women and children who 
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otherwise are doomed.”144 He promised to take a new look the U.S. neutrality policy in 
the region.  The Nixon Administration viewed their development of a Nigerian Civil War 
policy from a domestic perspective rather than from a foreign policy angle.  Making the 
American public believe Nixon cared about the Igbos was more important to the 
Administration than actually doing anything to stop the cause of their suffering.  Nixon’s 
Administration saw the president’s involvement in the war as a way to show his 
compassionate side to the American public.  The Igbo people were a compelling group 
for Americans.  They were characterized as a highly educated and largely Christian group 
who identified strongly with the U.S. ideals of capitalism and democracy.  The Biafrans 
adroit use of propaganda reinforced these points and made their plight the cause celebre 
throughout the western world.  The Nixon Administration was well aware of the 
popularity of the Biafran cause among U.S. citizens, members of Congress, the black 
community, and even among White House officials including Roger Morris and President 
Nixon.  Despite these feelings, the reality of the situation demanded that the 
Administration walk a fine line between alienating the Federal Military Government of 
Nigeria and providing relief to the starving Biafrans.   
Neither Nixon nor Kissinger trusted the career governmental officials at the State 
Department.  According to William Bundy, they both believed the career officers in the 
State Department maintained “liberal tendencies verging on disloyalty…and resistant to 
change.”145Roger Morris described them as a group of insulated elites who believed they 
knew what was best for the nation.  Morris also believed the State Department’s close 
relationship with foreign governments rendered them incapable of recommending the 
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best U.S. foreign policy options to the President.  He thought members of the State 
Department became clients of the foreign governments they worked with and refused to 
admit the faults of these governments.  Morris concluded this was because the officials 
closely associated their own future with that of their client.  To remedy this problem, 
Kissinger wanted to direct the Administration’s foreign policy decisions through his 
office.  He reasoned this would streamline the foreign policy decision-making process, 
and mitigate the compromised influence of the State Department.146 This competition 
between Kissinger and the State Department would continue throughout the duration of 
the Nigerian Civil War policy discussion, and influence President Nixon’s decision 
process. 
The Development of Nixon’s Initial Nigerian Policy 
Prior to his inauguration, Nixon’s foreign policy staff received copies of State 
Department situation report memorandums and policy recommendations from the U.S. 
Embassy in Lagos.  These memorandums showed the lack of support from the State 
Department and the Embassy in Lagos for any change in U.S. foreign policy toward 
Nigeria.  They also highlighted many of the problems the new administration would face 
if they tried to alter the current foreign policy. 
The first such telegram from the embassy staff in Lagos came in late December 
1968.  It outlined the options available to the United States according to embassy 
officials.  The telegram explained that the U.S. would likely not be able to exert much 
pressure on the Nigerian government because of the U.S. arms embargo placed on 
Nigeria.  The U.S. could not count on successfully leading an international embargo on 
foreign weapons to either side.  The memorandum explained the U.S. could only 
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convince the British to stop selling arms to the Nigerians, but the Soviets would not give 
up their influence with the Nigerians.  By forcing the British to remain neutral, the U.S. 
would force Nigeria further into the Soviet’s arms.  Similarly, the French would not 
likely halt their arms sales to the Biafrans either.  The result would be a conflict that 
would increasingly become one between east and west, U.S.SR and France.  The end 
result of such a conflict would likely be a continuation of the civil war and continued 
suffering by the Biafran civilians.147 
Increasing relief avenues was not easily accomplished either; one side or the other 
rejected plans to conduct daylight relief flights, or open land relief or a riverine relief 
corridors.  The Biafrans relied on night relief flights for food shipments, and arms 
shipments.  Each night, planes carrying arms flew with the planes carrying relief supplies 
to the airstrip in Uli, Biafra.  Keeping the Uli airstrip open during the war was critical to 
the Biafran’s ability to continue their fight for independence.  From the Biafran 
perspective, daylight relief flights would certainly allow more food to reach the starving 
Biafran civilians, but they feared Nigerian planes would follow the relief flights to the 
airstrip and bomb the supplies on the ground.  Since the older Soviet aircraft had limited 
night capabilities, the airstrip and the arms shipments were relatively safe from attack at 
night.  Daylight relief flights for Biafra would mean that all relief could be forced during 
the day, and only arms flights would fly at night.  This would cripple the Biafran ability 
to import arms and ultimately force them to surrender.  Similarly the Biafrans rejected the 
land relief route into their territory.  They argued Nigerian forces would also use the route 
as a high-speed avenue into the heart of Biafra.  The FMG did not support a water route 
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into Biafra, as they feared it would increase the flow of weapons into Biafra from the 
outside world.148 
The State Department telegram also addressed the probable result of U.S. 
recognition of Biafra.  U.S. recognition they believed would lead to some form of 
independence for Biafra.  The telegram explained how the Biafrans might be satisfied 
with some sort of limited independence arrangement, and Nigeria might also allow a 
portion of Biafra to remain independent.  State Department officials believed that the 
Nigerians would only grant independence to the Igbo portions of eastern Nigeria, an area 
smaller than the original boundaries of the eastern region.  While these possibilities 
seemed positive, they believed a more likely result would be continued fighting by the 
Biafrans until they regained their original eastern regional boundaries.  The FMG also 
would continue to contest any Biafran aggrandizement and request more military support 
from the Soviets.  The effect of these actions would be a continuation of the war and the 
suffering of civilians.  Another possible, though admittedly less likely outcome of U.S. 
recognition of Biafra would be the complete collapse of Nigeria along regional lines.  
Another problem with U.S. recognition would be the loss of support from many nations 
within Africa who had similar minority issues of their own.  The last negative outcome of 
recognition would be the increased risk the U.S. would place the 5,000 U.S. citizens 
(primarily working in the Nigerian oil industry) living in Nigeria.  According to the 
officials in Lagos, Nigerians were already skeptical of U.S. intentions based on their lack 
of support so far in the war, and recognition might turn the skepticism into violence.149 
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The same memorandum explained the key to ending the civil war was 
determining how to get France to agree to suspend its support for Biafra.  Specifically the 
telegram advised the U.S. and British government should “try to ascertain whether 
French price for cooperation in bringing war to end is one we can pay.”  The embassy 
officials also wrote that the FMG greatly respected Haile Selassie and appreciated his 
efforts on their behalf, but he was never going to be able to broker any peace agreement 
between the two sides.  The U.S. would be better off placing less pressure on Haile 
Selassie personally and focus on the OAU.  In their opinion, the FMG would have a 
harder time turning down the entire OAU than the head of one state despite the relations 
between the two governments.   
 The telegram ends with a statement directed to both the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations: “I (Ambassador Matthews) can only express fervent hope 
administration, present and incoming, will take firm stand against any US military 
involvement.”150 The telegram warned that any involvement would result in casualties 
and would only result in an escalation of the overall conflict.  The war would not 
immediately end as a result of U.S. intervention and the U.S. government would then 
have to decide to increase its involvement or unceremoniously withdraw.151 
The honeymoon period for the Nixon Administration’s Nigerian Civil War policy 
was non-existent.  On January 22, 1969 Roger Morris wrote Henry Kissinger a 
memorandum that included speeches from Senators Robert C. Byrd (D, West Virginia), 
Richard B. Russell (D, Georgia), Edward M. Kennedy (D, Massachusetts), James B. 
Pearson (R, Kansas), and Charles E. Goodell (R, New York) arguing for increased U.S. 
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involvement in Nigeria.  Morris explained to Kissinger, “I think these statements should 
be seen as the opening salvo of Congressional pressure that is likely to become more 
insistent and -- depending on our movement -- less indulgent toward the new 
Administration.”152 The next day the Washington Post ran a story stating that a majority 
of the Senate called on President Nixon to provide more aid and aircraft for the starving 
people caught in the Nigerian civil war.  In the margins of the article Kissinger wrote, 
“It’s time to spur State to get some action on this.”153 President Nixon had promised a 
review of the nation’s policy regarding the Nigerian Civil War and the Senate appeared to 
be holding them to that promise.  The Administration quickly assembled the following 
response to the reoccurring question about their solution to the continuing crisis in 
Nigeria.  The draft response to this question outlined the starting position for the 
administration.  It expressed the President’s deep concerned for the humanitarian disaster 
occurring in Eastern Nigeria.  The draft continued to explain their respect for the 
sovereignty of the Nigerian government, and how they would do everything possible to 
assist the people on both sides of the conflict.  The statement concluded that the 
Administration was reviewing their options for any future U.S. policy changes but had 
not made any decisions yet.154 
The Biafran foreign policy review was one of the first projects initiated by 
Kissinger’s National Security staff.155 They quickly put together a briefing on the 
Nigerian Civil War for the President that described the war thus far, the position of each 
side, the possibility of genocide, the politics of international relief, and other outside 
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influences on the conflict.  This memorandum outlined how Kissinger’s staff portrayed 
the war and the “tribal” nature of Nigerian politics to the President.156 
“The tribal implications of that coup triggered in turn a sequence of 
assassinations, tribal atrocities and polarization culminating in Eastern Nigeria’s 
secession as “Biafra” and the outbreak of a war 19 months ago.  The war is now 
stalemated with Federal Military Government (FMG) troops surrounding a 7,000 square 
mile Biafran enclave, or about ¼ the 30,000 square miles the rebels began with.  Little 
chance of a FMG victory within 6 months as long as arms continue to come into the 
Biafran enclave.”157 
The National Security staff described the FMG as maintaining fragile alliance that 
protracted war was not helping.  They believed that a long war might cause Gowon’s 
removal from power, and his replacement with a less moderate head who would be “less 
concerned about international opinion.”  The memorandum explained how the more 
hawkish elements in the FMG had grown increasingly weary of the lack of military 
progress shown thus far, and blamed the predominantly white relief operations for their 
military inadequacy.  They saw the relief agencies as sustaining the enemy with arms and 
food.158 
The staff sympathized more with the Biafran cause.  They believed that Ojukwu 
maintained the full support of his people, and as a result, morale was high enough to 
continue to fight.  They explained that the Biafrans were convinced that FMG victory 
equals Igbo massacres/genocide and therefore they would be unlikely to surrender.  
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Furthermore, the NSA staff pointed to the Biafran’s effective use of propaganda to win 
international sympathy for their cause and portray themselves as the victims of the war.159 
Negotiating a settlement between the two sides had proven impossible thus far in 
the war because neither was willing to agree to the preconditions the other demanded 
prior to any peace negotiations.  The FMG demanded a unified Nigeria and a return to the 
old Federal system prior to the war.  The Biafrans saw sovereignty as non-negotiable, and 
Ojukwu demanded a ceasefire before he would leave the country for talks.  The U.S. 
reiterated that the FMG leadership would not survive a cease-fire or protracted war.  The 
paper summed up the diplomatic situation as “irreconcilable”.160 
The paper addressed the issue of genocide and explained that it was not a 
legitimate issue in the war.  The paper cited reports from the UN Observer team that 
showed no evidence of genocide occurring after FMG has occupied Biafran territory.  
The paper explained Igbos feared Nigerians reprisal killings because of the previous 
slaughter of as many as 30,000 Igbos in Northern Nigeria prior to the war.161 
The next issue covered by the paper was Biafran starvation.  International relief 
agencies, according to U.S. estimates, fed an estimated 850,000 Nigerians and another 
2,000,000 in Biafra.  The paper covered the same alternative relief method issues as the 
State Department telegram from December 1968, adding the primary reason that the 
Biafrans had refused other relief options was because “they know the suffering is a 
political asset”.162 
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The role of international parties in the Nigerian civil war was another focus of the 
NSA background paper.  They looked at the British, Soviets, French, Africans, and the 
UN describing the degree of their involvement and the degree of influence each had on 
the Nigerians and Biafrans.  The British supported their former colony with small arms 
and ammunition, denying the sale of planes and more sophisticated weaponry.  By 
withholding advanced weaponry from the FMG, the British limited their influence over 
the FMG’s actions in the war and simultaneously alienated the Biafrans.  As a result, 
none of the British peace negotiation initiatives during the war seceded.163 The Soviets 
were the major arms suppliers to the FMG during the war selling the heavy weapons and 
aircraft that the British were unwilling to sell.  Despite these sales, the FMG denied that 
they were under the influence of the Soviets.  They repeatedly stated that the Soviet 
involvement “was only a matter of wartime necessity and portends no political 
realignment of Nigeria’s traditional pro-Western stance.”  Though the NSA paper seemed 
to believe these statements, they did report that there had been an increase in Soviet 
prestige and presence in Nigeria.  The National Security staff was not certain of the 
Soviet’s ultimate goals in their relationship with the Nigerians.  The Soviets had limited 
their involvement to arms sales and had refused to send soldiers, advisors, or pilots to 
fight with the FMG.164 According to the National Security staff, French clandestine arms 
sales to Biafra had allowed the Biafrans to continue the war.  They believed that French 
President Charles De Gaulle had two major motivations: a desire to break up the 
Commonwealth’s strong influences in West Africa and the desire to gain the U.S. and 
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British oil concessions in eastern Nigeria.165 African leaders generally saw Nigeria’s 
problems resulting from colonial boundaries that enclosed diverse populations under a 
single polity.  The NSA attributed the near unanimous support for the FMG to African 
fears of secession within their own nations.  The OAU consultative committee had been 
unsuccessful in their attempts to resolve the conflict, but was still trying to achieve 
results.  The NSA staff concluded that the African states as a collective whole or 
individually did not have much leverage over either side.166 The United Nations played 
no real role in the war.  It had shown no interest in getting involved in the war, arguing 
that it was an internal conflict outside of its mandate.167 
The Johnson Administration policy had increased only food aid to Biafra without 
risking further involvement.  Up to that point, the U.S. had provided 60% of all relief 
support given to the Biafrans.  The official stance of the U.S. government on the need for 
U.S. political involvement in Nigeria was that the civil war was an internal conflict that 
foreign powers should only intervene to prevent civilian starvation.  So far the U.S. had 
not recognized the Biafrans as a sovereign nation, had embargoed arms to both sides, and 
contributed money to the relief funds.  The U.S. looked to the OAU and the British to 
assume the lead the peace process and the ICRC to lead the relief efforts.168 
This National Security Staff background paper illustrated what Kissinger and his 
staff knew about the civil war in Nigeria and the problems they believed they faced in 
crafting a new foreign policy.  The paper essentially echoed the sentiment of the State 
Department with few exceptions.  This account was a little more critical of the FMG but 
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acknowledged that increased U.S. involvement in the war would likely yield few positive 
results for the U.S. or the people in Nigeria. 
Roger Morris drafted a memorandum to Kissinger on February 12, 1969 that 
outlined the problems and options for the President’s policy towards the Nigerian Civil 
War.  Morris saw “presidential interest in this problem as a limited two-fold aim: 1. 
Answer and relieve domestic pressure by demonstrating (a) the President’s serious 
concern for suffering, and (b) that the Administration is carrying on a fresh and top 
priority search for practical solutions. 2. A credible try to get more food without (a) 
greater political involvement on either side, or (b) risk to American lives, property, and 
long-range political interests.”169 
With these two general criteria the NSA staff developed six distinct U.S. policy 
options based on the need to increase U.S. involvement in relief operations.  The first 
option was to increase relief efforts with the agreement of both sides.  This policy would 
not increase U.S. political involvement in the conflict, and would maintain their ability to 
claim neutrality.  The downside of this policy was that since neither side seemed willing 
to compromise on the relief options, this option was not likely to help any of the civilian 
victims of the war.  The second option was to increase relief operations with the at least 
the agreement of the FMG.  The U.S. would have to be willing to give greater support for 
the FMG (politically and/or militarily) in exchange for an agreement to daylight relief 
flights.  The U.S. would ask for Biafran or OAU support for the plan, but would not wait 
on their approval.  The problem with this option was that if the FMG would not agree, the 
Biafrans would score a major propaganda victory and the civilians would continue to 
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suffer.  The third option called for all out support for the FMG and forcing aid on the 
Biafrans through airdrops of relief supplies.  This option would get relief to the Biafrans 
and would help end the war more rapidly.  The liability of this option was that the 
American public generally supported the Biafran cause and would not approve of an 
American policy obviously aimed at crushing the Biafran military.  The fourth option 
would increase relief to the Biafrans without the support of the FMG.  This would appeal 
to the Biafran supporters within the United States, but would put all of the relief flights at 
risk from Nigerian military intervention.  This plan would also do nothing to help the 
civilians in Nigeria effected by the war and would hurt the future U.S. relationship with 
the Nigerian government.  The fifth option called for increasing relief to Biafra without 
FMG agreement, while the U.S. would claim full neutrality.  This plan differed from the 
fourth option only in the call for neutrality.  While this would appeal greatly to critics in 
the Congress, the FMG would view it as hostile to them and public support for the 
Biafrans.  The sixth and final option was offering full diplomatic recognition and perhaps 
arming the Biafrans.  This action would allow the U.S. to gain another client state in the 
region, but might only serve to expand the conflict with increased involvement of the 
Soviets.170 
Morris explained to Kissinger the pitfalls of any of the decisions for the President.  
He believed that all of the decisions would indicate the administration’s support for one 
side of the conflict or the other with the associated advantages and disadvantages that 
their support would entail.  The State and Defense departments widely supported the 
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Federal side of the conflict, and they pushed the Administration to pursue option 2, 
expanding relief with the consent of the FMG despite potential Biafran objections.   
According to Morris, the State and Defense departments believed that option 2 
would require more overt support for the FMG, a step they were more than ready to take.  
Morris, who opposed the recommendations of the State department throughout the crisis, 
agreed with the pursuit of option 2 for a different reason.  In his opinion this option 
allowed the U.S. to follow the most neutral path to a solution in the war.  His advice for 
Kissinger was to approach both sides with a plan to set up a land relief corridor into 
Biafra.  He saw publicizing resistance by either side as the only leverage to force 
compliance with a U.S. led plan.  Morris pointed out that if either side balked at such an 
agreement, the Administration could “brand the obstructor and disengage, continuing 
present levels of relief with a clear conscience.”171 The major considerations within this 
plan according to Morris were that the FMG would want greater political support for their 
demand for one Nigeria and that our future relations with Nigeria prevent the U.S. from 
stigmatizing them with the rest of the world.   
Morris summed up his argument by saying that the U.S. should try to remain as 
neutral as possible during the war.  He told Kissinger that he should reconsider fully 
backing the “Feds at a time when the odds are at least even that they’re the wrong horse 
to back.  My own (minority) view right now is that Biafra is going to make it one way or 
another.”  He concluded by telling Kissinger that whatever happens in Nigeria, the U.S. 
will have to deal with less palatable nation run not by “the English-mannered elite we’ve 
known since 1960, but rather the bloated and fresh-from-the-bush Federal army, which 
has put automatic weapons at the service of fractious tribal loyalties.”   Whether he truly 
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believed the Biafrans would win is hard to say, but it was apparent from his concluding 
statements that he distrusted the Nigerians and personally wanted to see the Biafrans 
succeed.172 
Throughout the remainder of the war, Roger Morris continued to provide 
Kissinger with similar advice supporting the Biafran cause.  He distrusted the motivations 
of the State Department officials who supported the FMG and he probably knew 
Kissinger’s personal position on the war was more closely aligned with the pragmatists in 
the State Department than Morris’ pro-Biafran stance.  Morris most likely played on 
Kissinger’s own distrust of the State Department and recommended neutrality as a way to 
prevent Kissinger from adopting the State Department’s more FMG friendly position. 
Domestic politics had perhaps the largest role in the determination of the proper 
policy choice for the Nixon Administration in the Nigerian Civil War.  The two biggest 
domestic considerations of the Administration’s policy in Nigeria according Robert 
Brown (one of Nixon’s Special Assistants) were the reactions of the black Americans and 
the creation of an urban platform issue to use against the Administration.  Brown’s 
memorandum explained that African Americans saw the current policy towards 
Nigeria/Biafra as unconcerned about a war that was just “blacks killing blacks.”173 
Brown believed that radical black activists would pick up this as a rallying point because 
of its simplicity and emotional appeal.  Similarly, urban politicians would use the 
sympathetic plight of the Biafrans to rally support like they had among “the three I’s, 
 
172 Morris to Kissinger, FEB. 12, 1969; NSC Country Files; NACP. 
173 Robert J. Brown, (Special Assistant to the President) to Richard Nixon, (President of the United States) 
memorandum “Biafran and American Domestic Politics -- Proposals for Action”, FEB. 18, 1969; NSC 
Country Files; NACP. 
74 
Italians, Irish, and Israelis.”174 Both of these groups would only serve to heighten racial 
and minority tensions within the country.  Brown recommended appointing a high level 
commission to publicize U.S. relief efforts and add a more human face to the 
Administration’s policy.  This group would also be able to provide a template for future 
actions in African crises.  In addition to these steps, the Administration should discourage 
the numerous high level trips to Nigeria.  He argued the multitude of visits to Nigeria sent 
mixed messages to the Nigerians about U.S. policy intentions, and exacerbated domestic 
criticisms.  The final recommendation was to appoint more black officials in the State 
Department.175 
Based on this early analysis of the situation in Nigeria and at home, Kissinger and 
his staff persuaded President Nixon that the best course to chart for the U.S. policy in 
Nigeria was to appear concerned with the crisis by taking a few high profile steps like 
appointing a new Ambassador to Nigeria and creation of a U.S. Special Coordinator for 
Relief.  These steps would appease the Administration’s critics temporarily, but also give 
the Administration time to let the situation in Nigeria develop without having to take 
sides.  Replacing Ambassador Elbert G. Matthews appeared to be an expedient way for 
the Administration to distance itself from the Johnson Administration’s Nigerian policy.  
Critics of U.S. policy and the Biafrans associated Matthews with the “worst publicity on 
the Johnson policy” and believed him to be little more than a yes man for Lagos.176 
Matthews had served for four years as ambassador and was due to rotate out anyway, so 
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the move could be justified to Nigerian and Biafran supporters.  Furthermore, creating a 
relief coordinator position would allow the President to appear to change the U.S. policy 
towards Nigeria without taking sides in the conflict.  Morris agreed that appointing a 
black commissioner on relief would be a good move domestically, for the reasons Robert 
Brown had mentioned, and also would play well in Lagos.  Morris explained that political 
figures in Nigeria see western relief increasingly through a racial lens.  Morris 
summarized the feeling in Nigeria that the white relief operations and white visitors to 
their country all wanted to tell them how to run their country and “a negro ambassador 
might be very good local politics in Lagos.”177 
President Nixon took the advice of his National Security staff and publicly 
announced his appointment of Clyde Ferguson to the position of U.S. Special 
Coordinator for Relief on February 26, 1969.178 The Nixon Administration believed 
Ferguson was a good fit for the job.  He was distinguished law professor at Rutgers 
University and an outsider to Washington politics.  Perhaps politically his greatest 
qualification for the job was his skin color.  “When asked why Ferguson headed the State 
Department list of recommended coordinators, a senior diplomat replied, ‘What could be 
better than giving Teddy (Senator Edward Kennedy) a black man to lean on?’”179 
Administration Evaluates their Nigerian Policy 
The nomination of Clyde Ferguson ended the first phase of the Nixon 
Administration’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War.  The general plan recommended 
to and accepted by President Nixon was to increase public demonstrations of White 
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House concern and involvement while continuing the Johnson policy of pro-Federal 
neutrality in practice.  With the immediate policy critics mollified by the 
Administration’s initial response, the State Department and Kissinger’s staff continued to 
monitor the diplomatic and military developments in Nigeria during the spring of 1969.   
According to the State Department and the National Security Staff, the 
international diplomatic situation seemed to have changed little.  The U.S. Embassy in 
Lagos sent a telegram on February 19, 1969 that more Soviet bombers (IL-28s) arrived in 
Nigeria and they were potentially equipped with radar to conduct night missions. 180 
The second telegram, sent on March 10, 1969 from the U.S. Embassy in Lagos to the 
State Department, described the current assessment of Soviet influence in Nigeria.  The 
telegram downplayed the importance of the Soviet influence in Nigeria despite an 
increased Soviet presence in Lagos, and the March 1969 port call by the Soviet fleet in 
Nigeria.  The embassy added that Gowon had reassured the Ambassador that his 
relationship with the Soviets “was not ideological but rather dictated by necessity of 
obtaining arms which FMG cannot get from UK, U.S., or other western nations.”181 
The telegram cited an increased number of anti-western and anti-U.S. newspaper 
articles mostly due to frustration with the progress of the war.  The embassy believed 
these articles might have some influence on political leaders in Nigeria, but their 
influence in general among the population was minimal.  Despite these reassurances, the 
telegram did mention the minority view among some senior officials at the embassy who 
warned of the increased friendliness between the Nigerians and the Soviets.  They also 
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pointed to the increased size of the Soviet Embassy in Lagos as further evidence of the 
increased efforts by the U.S.S.R. to gain influence with the Nigerians.  The bottom line of 
the report was that Soviet influence in Nigeria was small, and economically the Soviets 
were still a small part of the equation.182 
Henry Kissinger summed up the diplomatic and military situations in Nigeria to 
the President in two memoranda dated April 12, 1969 and May 15, 1969.  Kissinger saw 
little evidence of movement towards a negotiated settlement of the war.  He wrote that 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s visit to Nigeria went nowhere with the Nigerians.  
Wilson’s position was equally as unpopular in the U.K. for his support of the FMG.  
Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire was not making much progress either because the 
Federal government did not trust him.  The OAU was trying to set up peace talks in 
Monrovia, but neither side would come without preconditions unacceptable to the other.  
Kissinger added his opinion that Clyde Ferguson was not doing much either with the 
exception of quieting U.S. domestic criticism of the Administration’s policy.  Kissinger 
warned that if the FMG did not win soon the war would continue until at least the late 
summer.  “One general prospect at least seems clear: every passing day increases the war 
weariness and political unrest on the Federal side, while it strengthens Biafran morale.  
And though there is no real sign of it now, a lengthening war is also bound to give 
Federal backers--the Soviets as well as the harried British--second thoughts.  The least 
vulnerable party in the Nigerian tangle is the one who has invested less and influenced 
more than any other--General de Gaulle.”183 
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As predicted, the OAU peace talks in Monrovia ended without achieving any 
results.  The Biafrans explained the reason for breaking off negotiations was the OAU’s 
failure to describe what ‘Nigerian unity’ meant in terms of the future governmental 
relationship between Biafra and Nigeria to the satisfaction of the Biafran delegation.  As 
they left the talks, the Biafrans called for another party to mediate future peace talks 
because they believed the OAU had “neither the ability or desire to bring about a 
peace.”184 
In his second memorandum in May 1969, Kissinger repeated many of the Biafran 
criticisms of the OAU and their lack of neutrality in the negotiation process.  Kissinger 
minimized the importance of the OAU talks.  “African peace-making in this war, 
however, has been more talk than action.  Much as the OAU parades its special mandate 
(and expects outsiders to accept it), they have failed on two important counts:  (1) OAU 
bias towards the FMG is apparent, denying them any credibility as a neutral mediator of 
the conflict, and (2) talk of reconciliation is never coupled with realistic guarantees of Ibo 
safety.  To their credit, even in the best of circumstances, neither side is willing to 
concede anything because both believe that they can win.185 
Kissinger’s memoranda also painted a bleak picture of the Nigerian progress thus 
far in the war.  He wrote that the Nigerian army was on the move again, but they were 
fighting to retake terrain they had already taken before, just to lose it to the Biafrans.  
Biafra was getting sufficient arms from airlift to continue to resist the Nigerians.  Two of 
the three Nigerian divisions had yet to move in the west and south, and Kissinger 
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believed that even taking the Biafran capital would likely do nothing to end the war.  
During the lull in the war, U.S. Embassy officials reported an increase in French arms 
shipments to the highest levels so far in the war.186 
Kissinger began his May 1969 Nigerian Civil War military situation summary 
with a sarcastic description the most recent ‘final push’ of the Federal military campaign 
as continuing for over a month.  He reported that the FMG’s success in capturing the 
capital of Umuahia hurt the Biafrans administratively, but they were conducting a 
counter-attack on the city at the present.  He continued his depreciating account of the 
Federal progress writing; “meanwhile (and equally ironic in light of the talk of a ‘final 
push’) the Biafrans have scored impressive victories on the southern front.  They have 
recaptured the town of Owerri (normally a much more important possession than 
Umuahia).” 187 They have continued progress towards Port Harcourt, which in 
Kissinger’s opinion was the most important prize in the war.  He explained that Nigerian 
oil facilities would seem a likely target to capture, or disable (though the Biafrans haven’t 
yet but might strike at them to send a message).  He believed the FMG retained the 
advantage in the war despite their lack of overwhelming battlefield success.  He 
explained,  
The fact remains, as always, that the Federal side has the men and the material to 
prevail militarily in the end.  Logistically, Biafra cannot win a war of attrition.  
But rebel resilience and staying power, embellished by Federal ineptitude, could 
still prolong the fighting to the point of political, if not material exhaustion on the 
Federal side.  The key military factor is still the continuation of the arms airlift to 
Biafra made possible largely through clandestine French support.188 
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Within the Federal Military Government the political situation was still tenuous.  
Gowon replaced his corrupt division commanders despite the likelihood of tribal and 
regional objections.  “That he took the political risk to make a switch, however, indicates 
Gowon’s resignation to a prolonged fight.”189 It also showed that his position in power 
was stronger than his detractors had admitted. 
The relief situation seemed no better during this same time.  Despite Clyde 
Ferguson’s announcement that the total U.S. public and private contributions for relief 
operations exceeded $31 million, relief supplies were still only arriving in Biafra through 
night flights.190 During the spring Ferguson conducted preliminary meetings with Gowon 
on the subject of daylight relief flights and the establishment of a land and river relief 
corridors.  His initial report indicated Gowon’s willingness to allow both daylight flights 
and the establishment of a land relief corridor.191 The increased spending on relief and 
initial agreement to the expansion of the relief corridor did little to appease the American 
public’s desire to stop the starvation of Biafran children.  The White House reported a 
doubling of the number of letters sent to the State Department supporting increased 
involvement in the Nigerian civil war doubled, and a tripling of the same type of letters to 
the White House.192 
The combination of lack of Nigerian progress in the war and the public demand 
for increased action despite the increased U.S. funding for relief operations weighed 
heavily on President Nixon.  Nixon began to see little value in guaranteeing the unity of 
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Nigeria at the expense of the Biafran people.  The President shared his personal feelings 
with Kissinger on the front of both the April and May memorandums.  In the margin of 
Kissinger’s April 1969 memorandum Nixon wrote, “I have decided that our policy 
supporting the Feds is wrong.  They can’t make it.  Let’s begin to get State off this 
kick.”193 He reiterated his support for the Biafrans on the front of the May 1969 
memorandum when he wrote, “I hope the Biafrans survive!”194 
According to Roger Morris’ account of the period and historian John Stremlau’s 
depiction of Kissinger’s practical approach to the Nigerian Civil War; Kissinger probably 
did not share Nixon’s opinions about the Biafrans.  Kissinger did not believe either side 
was close to winning the war in Nigeria.  The diplomatic attempts from the British and 
African were doomed to fail because of their lack of neutrality, and neither side seemed 
willing to sacrifice military advantage to save the lives of innocent children in Biafra.  
The only certainty in the war seemed to be the growing disenchantment of the U.S. public 
with their government’s inability to feed the Biafrans.  Kissinger concluded his May 1969 
memorandum with the following statement: 
I am satisfied thus far that our policy is being carried out with the political non-
involvement and basic neutrality (standing clear of the Federals), which you 
instructed.  It may be useful later in the summer, however, to take another look at 
our options -- primarily to ensure they remain open, but also to examine any new 
possibility that we could or should play a more active role in helping to bring this 
war to an end.195 
Given Kissinger’s reluctance to become involved in the Nigerian Civil War, he 
obviously realized that the Administration’s current policy was not satisfying its critics or 
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helping to stop the war.  Events in Nigeria in early June 1969 forced the Nixon 
Administration to begin its policy review earlier than Kissinger had predicted. 
VII Nixon Considers Increased Involvement 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
On June 6, 1969, a FMG aircraft shot down an ICRC relief airplane enroute to Biafra.  In 
response to this action the ICRC suspended all of its relief flights into Biafra.196 This 
action, and Kissinger’s earlier prediction that the President would likely have to 
reconsider the current U.S. policy in Nigeria led to the first serious discussions about 
greater U.S. involvement in finding a peaceful solution to the war.  The ICRC was the 
only relief organization operating in the region with the official sanction of the FMG.  
According to the Nigerians, the other religious-based relief organizations operated 
‘illegally’ in Nigeria.  Though the U.S. had given financial support and even provided 
some religious-based organizations with aircraft in December 1968, the U.S. had 
depended on the ICRC to distribute the bulk of the relief supplies that the U.S. purchased 
for Nigeria.   
Now the U.S. would have to decide whether to shift their support to the religious 
organizations despite Nigerian objections or stop U.S. relief efforts completely.  Neither 
was an appealing option for an administration that still wanted to maintain its neutrality.  
The only other option was to increase the efforts to negotiate alternative means for relief 
supplies to enter Biafra.  This option meant increased U.S. political involvement in the 
conflict to bring both sides to the negotiating table.  Such an attempt had proven elusive 
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in other diplomatic attempts, and the U.S. could not assume any greater chance of success 
than its predecessors.197 
Administration Considers the Options 
On July 3, 1969 Roger Morris sent Kissinger a memorandum outlining the 
possible next steps in Nigeria for the Administration.  He identified four broad policy 
choices.  1) Stay the course.  A policy with little or no chance of success but required no 
greater involvement.  2) Walk away; and support relief when both sides agree to a relief 
option, but not before.  Essentially tell them that the U.S. could not help those who 
cannot help themselves.  This policy would receive criticism, but Morris thought the 
Administration could weather it if they remained resolute in their decision.  3) Support 
relief with or without Federal approval.  This option would satisfy critics, but would 
destroy hopes of any future relationship with the Nigerians and threatened the welfare of 
the 5,000 U.S. citizens in Nigeria.  4) Engage in serious diplomatic efforts to end the war.  
Morris felt that it might work, or might not.  If it did not then he said the U.S. could end 
their involvement and say they tried.  He believed that the chances were slim that option 
would work.  His recommendation to Kissinger was, “Frankly, I would recommend your 
support for a diplomatic effort to stop the war.”198 
Four days later, Kissinger sent another status report on the Nigerian civil war to 
President Nixon and included his own recommendation on the next steps for the U.S. 
policy.  He told the President that there was no plausible alternative to daylight flights.  
The progress on the other relief corridors had not gained support from either side of the 
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conflict.  Kissinger explained that neither side trusted Clyde Ferguson.  The Federals saw 
him as soft on the Biafrans, and the Biafrans believed he was too closely associated with 
the U.S. State Department.  Hawks within the FMG renewed their rhetoric about the 
legitimacy of starvation as a weapon of war.  Statements such as these had dimmed the 
world’s opinion of the Federal side and added credence to the Biafrans’ fears of the 
FMG’s genocidal intentions.  Kissinger explained that, “our present policy--limited 
largely to exhortation by both sides--seems at the end of its usefulness.  The heart of the 
relief problem is clearly the war itself.  So long as the fighting continues, both sides will 
have reasons to reject relief and more Biafrans will starve.”199 Kissinger offered the 
President two basic policy options 1) stay the course and accept the current futility of 
U.S. actions, or 2) make a serious attempt to end the war.200 
He discounted the first basic option as unrealistic given the current state of relief 
in Biafra, and offered three options (that could be enacted not necessarily to the exclusion 
of one another) to break the impasse.  The first option was contesting the FMG relief 
embargo.  This option would anger the Nigerians, but would allow the U.S. to appear less 
compliant towards FMG demands.  The second option was to ask the UN to provide the 
guarantee of safety for daylight flights.  This would eliminate the Biafran excuse that the 
FMG air force would use daylight flights to attack their airfields and force them either to 
agree to the daylight flights or look like they were denying relief to their own people.  
The third option was to separate the Administration’s relief efforts and their pro-Federal 
stance.  Kissinger explained, “We can reasonably expect dramatic window dressing of 
this kind to soften the domestic critics for a while.  But your greater involvement also 
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raises expectations of tangible progress.”201 This was not an action memorandum and did 
not recommend one action over another.  It is likely that Kissinger was merely giving the 
President some advanced warning that he would need to make a policy decision soon.   
A week later Nixon realized that he needed to make that decision.  On July 14, 
1969, an ad appeared in the New York Times explaining that the Nigerian Civil War was 
killing more children than soldiers.  It asked why the President of the United States, the 
most powerful man in the world, was not doing anything.  According to a memorandum 
from Kissinger, the President read the ad and told him: “Henry, I agree with this.  
Moreover, I have decided that I (not State) should try to do something to conciliate the 
situation.  Haile Selassie agrees.* Please give me a plan.”202 Kissinger’s staff produced 
another situation update for the President outlining the following topics: “where we 
stand”, “our choices”, “disengagement”, “trying a settlement”, and a “summary” with a 
recommendation. 
 The paragraph describing, “where we stand,” explained the current state of relief 
operations in Nigeria.  Kissinger opened with a description of the political climate within 
the Nigerian government.  He said that hardliners were in charge of the government and 
that these elements were frustrated with the stalemate.  The recent downing of the ICRC 
flight was an example of how these hardliners were taking their frustrations out on the 
international relief operations.  He also explained that he expected the daylight flight 
talks to drag out, and that the FMG would not agree to airdrops.  This effectively ruled 
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out increasing relief operations through the most neutral channels.  Kissinger concluded 
this section with a summary of the likely courses of action of the other international 
participants in the conflict.  In his opinion, the U.S. could no longer count on any of these 
third parties to take the lead in brokering a political settlement.  “Nobody else will bail us 
out.  Moscow can bide its time.  Paris will wait to be courted.  London will take the 
public heat.  Unguided, the Africans are hopeless.”203 
Kissinger stated that the president had to make a policy change.  The current 
policy was a failure both in Nigeria and in the U.S.  Domestic critics and both sides in 
Nigeria doubted the sincerity of U.S. neutrality.  The Nigerians had taken advantage of 
the current policy and were, in Kissinger’s words, “slapping us and getting away with 
it.”204 
Disengagement, according to the memorandum would not be popular at home.  
Such a move would cripple the relief operations that would lose about half of their 
financial backing.  The move would also sour the already tenuous relationship between 
the U.S. and the FMG.  The only certain result of withdrawal would be the continued 
starvation of the Nigerian and Biafran people.205 
At this point, Kissinger agreed with Roger Morris’s suggestion to try and 
negotiate a settlement between the two sides.  The benefits to a settlement according to 
Kissinger were twofold: it would provide the Administration with credibility at home and 
abroad, and would prevent three possible negative outcomes, stalemate and the complete 
victory by either side.  The disadvantages of a stalemate were the increased reliance on 
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foreigners and the rising likelihood of a new east versus west conflict in Africa.  There 
were three problems with a FMG victory: the possibility of genocide against the Igbos, 
potential damage to oil infrastructure by Igbo guerilla action, and the rise of a repressive 
regime in Lagos who would likely spark further regional conflict among other minority 
groups.  An independent Biafra on the other hand, would encourage the disintegration of 
Nigeria and encourage more involvement of great powers as had occurred in the Middle 
East.  Simply put, U.S. interests rested in a unified Nigeria.  Kissinger continued to try 
and follow a neutral route by justifying that settling the war did not necessarily mean that 
the U.S. was pro-Biafra.  In Kissinger’s opinion, settlement was the best interests of the 
west.  A prolonged war was only a good thing for the Soviets, who would increase their 
influence over the Nigerians through continued arms sales.  The British influence in the 
country would continue to decrease at the same time.  Kissinger believed that the U.S. 
should act like a world power and act decisively to stop the war.206 
The U.S. could not create a peace without the help of other nations.  Kissinger 
explained that the U.S. needed the support of the French to get the Biafrans’ attention.  
Kissinger predicted that the French wanted to get out of the war, but they would not 
simply abandon the Biafrans.  The support of the Canadians would also assist in the 
process because of their negotiating skills.  Prime Minister Trudeau would likely agree to 
help if he could receive some credit for solving the crisis.  In Africa, the Ghanaians 
would gladly assume the role as front men in the settlement process.  Finally, Kissinger 
felt that the British should be left out.  He explained that they would at best, take too 
much of the credit for any peace deal, and at worst, might sabotage the agreement.  
Furthermore they were far too involved to appear neutral in any negotiation.  The best 
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role for them would be to coach the FMG negotiators so they could attempt to equal the 
abilities of the Biafrans.207 
Kissinger summarized his recommendation stating: “Trying a political settlement 
is the only defensible basis for disengagement.  It is in our interests.  It may be possible.  
Its costs -- even in failure -- are less than those of inaction.  Our dilemma is not in the 
selection of a client.  The Feds must clearly be our choice.  The problem is heading right 
now towards a disastrous result for both of us.”208 
Despite Nixon’s request for a plan of action, Kissinger had not brought a decision 
memorandum to the President where he asked for definitive guidance on a policy change.  
Kissinger was still trying to keep the U.S. from choosing sides and getting involved.  He 
had thus far only updated the President on the changing situation in Nigeria, but did not 
want the President to commit to any particular action.  On August 7, 1969, Kissinger 
finally sent a decision memorandum to President Nixon that marked something of a half 
step toward U.S. political involvement in the Nigerian civil war.   
Thus far, all of the peace initiatives from third parties had failed.  Kissinger 
believed that Nixon’s prestige would force a peace talk between the two sides.  At this 
point negotiations might be more appealing to both sides because the war was again 
stalemated and both could see value in serious negotiations.  The problem was not getting 
the two sides to the table; it was keeping them there that had always proven difficult.  The 
Federal government was particularly wary of any peace talks since the Biafrans had out 
negotiated them several times in the past.  International reaction to the talks would be 
mixed.  The British would want to take an active role, but Kissinger advised against any 
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British involvement for previously discussed bias reasons.  He repeated that the French 
might welcome a way to get out of supporting the Biafrans in this war, but would still be 
on the look out for a pro-federalist bias.  The Soviets would not be enthusiastic of a U.S. 
brokered peace because they had nothing to gain with peace talks and much to gain with 
a prolonged war.  The Africans were “probably resigned to their impotence and would 
quietly welcome a serious U.S. initiative.”209 They would not have the support of all 
African leaders and would cry “neo-colonialism” if it didn’t work out.210 
Kissinger outlined four separate formats for the peace talks: 1) Four power 
discussions (U.S., UK, U.S.SR, France).  The problems with this option were that French 
would see it as 3 against 1, and Africans would see it as a reminder of their subordinate 
status. 2) U.S.-Canadian led talks.  The Canadians would bring shrewd and practiced 
negotiators to assist in the agreement, but it would place them in an awkward position 
between Great Britain and France.  3) U.S.-Ethiopian led talks.  This option would cover 
the African flank, but the Biafrans did not trust the Ethiopians and the Ethiopians were 
not skilled negotiators.  4) U.S. good offices, U.S. independent talks.  The benefit was 
that the Administration would have the freedom to do what it thought was right without 
having to consult or respect the wishes of others.  The significant negative was if it failed 
the Administration would have no one else to blame.211 
Taking his usual careful path, Kissinger recommended that there was no need to 
decide on one of the four options immediately.  He advised that his staff could do some 
behind the scenes work with each side to see what would work.  This way the White 
House could exclude the State Department from involvement.  This would give the secret 
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negotiations more credibility with the Biafrans who distrusted the State Department as 
pro-Federal.  Kissinger believed this process had a fair chance of working, and saw few 
of the grave pitfalls of the immediate action.  He further explained that since there were 
no other peace initiatives in progress at the present time, their efforts would not spoil any 
other peace negotiations.  Kissinger asked for the President’s approval for Kissinger’s 
staff to allow Norman Cousins (the editor of Saturday Review in New York City) to 
travel to Biafra and organize a meeting with Biafran representatives and members of 
Kissinger’s staff in New York.  Nixon approved these meetings at the bottom of the 
memorandum. 
 Meanwhile, the ICRC had imposed a deadline on September 1, 1969 for the FMG 
to negotiate some type of agreement to daylight relief flights into Biafra.  On August 30, 
1969, Roger Morris wrote Kissinger a memorandum on the situation.  Morris’s 
explanation of the situation indicated an ICRC pullout from Nigeria would leave the U.S. 
with only the ‘illegally operating’ religious-based relief groups or pulling all relief out of 
Nigeria.212 Kissinger never had to address this issue because the Nigerians reached an 
agreement with the ICRC with two stipulations on daylight relief.  These stipulations 
were: 1) The relief organizations had to mark any aircraft remaining on ground at night 
on the Biafran airfields so the Nigerian air force pilots could distinguish them and 2) The 
Nigerians would agree to the flights as long as they did not interfere with Nigerian 
military objectives.213 
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U.S. Actively Seeks Daylight Relief Flight Resolution 
After the Nigerians had agreed to ICRC daylight relief flights, Kissinger sent a 
decision memorandum to the President on September 20, 1969 recommending he push 
more openly for a bilateral agreement on daylight relief flights.  The U.S. initiative would 
have the ICRC propose internationally inspected daylight relief flights that neither side 
could use for military advantage.  The FMG had already agreed to such an action for a 
three-week trial period.  The biggest hurdle would be getting the Biafrans to agree as 
well.  They would still be worried about the FMG using the flights to attack their 
airfields.  Kissinger pointed to two major motives for the Biafran’s demand for FMG 
guarantees to allow the daylight flights safe passage: the first was their fear that the FMG 
would abuse the route while the world did nothing to stop them, and the second, and 
more cynical reason, was the Biafrans wanted to stall the process so they would not look 
bad by refusing the help.  Kissinger said the U.S. could eliminate these considerations by 
giving the ICRC more sophisticated communications equipment and get Canadian 
aircraft to escort the relief flights.  These two steps would prevent any potential Nigerian 
abuses and eliminate any legitimate Biafran excuses.214 
Kissinger told the President, “I believe that the initiative here is worth seizing.”215 
He saw no other alternative to increasing U.S. involvement in Nigeria.  Doing nothing 
would cause more Biafran starvation, the continued decline of U.S. Nigerian relations, 
and the total reliance nighttime airlift by Church voluntary agencies to deliver aid into 
Biafra.  These agencies were operating illegally and Kissinger feared that since most of 
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them were using U.S. planes and pilots, their eventual interdiction by Nigerian aircraft 
would bring the two countries into political conflict with each other.  He saw daylight 
flights as “the only real remedy to these considerable risks.”216 Nixon approved the 
memorandum and wrote “good work!” below his initials.217 
Kissinger’s recommendation to President Nixon to negotiate a peace settlement in 
Nigeria without the State Department was part of a growing pattern of centralization of 
the Administration’s Nigeria policy.  Three days prior, one of Kissinger’s NSC staff 
members, William Watts sent the Secretary of State’s Executive Secretary, Theodore 
Eliot a memorandum giving him the President’s instruction “that all policy telegrams and 
major public statements concerning the Nigerian Civil War should receive a White House 
clearance.”218 Kissinger and Morris long believed that the State Department’s obvious 
bias towards the FMG prevented them from implementing the President’s intent to pursue 
a neutral policy in Nigeria.   
An example of the disagreement between the National Security staff’s position 
and that of the State Department was evident in a memorandum from Morris to Kissinger 
describing the State Department’s proposed comments for the incoming U.S. 
Ambassador in Lagos, William C. Trueheart.  The State Department comments, 
according to Morris were completely “contrary to the President’s policy as I understand 
it.”219 Morris highlighted one passage in the text that exemplified the deliberate 
modification of the President’s neutrality policy.  The offending passage would have had 
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the new U.S. Ambassador tell General Gowon that the United States “has made it clear 
that it supports the concept of ‘One Nigeria’.”220 Morris also told Kissinger that the State 
Department wanted the President to send Gowon a “love letter” in their words, 
“conveying our admiration (not appreciation) for Gowon’s handling of ICRC 
negotiations.”221 
Despite his reservations about the State Department’s biases, Morris 
recommended to Kissinger in a later memorandum that they include Under-Secretary 
Elliot Richardson in their covert Cousins peace talk initiative.  Morris felt that greater 
White House and State Department/African Bureau dialog would produce a more unifies 
U.S. approach to the Nigeria/Biafra policy.  He argued that the current circumvention of 
the State Department was hindering the President’s daylight flight initiative.222 Kissinger 
obviously disagreed with Morris because he never involved anyone from the State 
Department in any of his secret negotiation plans. 
 Daylight relief flight negotiations with Ojukwu and the Biafran government had 
not gone as smoothly as those with the FMG.  The Administration had suspected that 
convincing Biafra to accept the daylight flights would not be easy.  Norman Cousins sent 
Kissinger a memorandum outlining the Biafran responses to the Administration’s 
questions about the Biafran view on U.S. brokered peace talks and daylight relief flights.  
Biafran Traveling Foreign Affairs Minister G.A. Onyegbula expressed a willingness to 
have the U.S. begin peace negotiations either privately or publicly.  He told Cousins that 
the U.S. could serve in any capacity either as the principle in the talks or merely to bring 
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the two sides to the table.  He explained that the two sides did not need a third party to 
facilitate the negotiations, but the prestige of the United States would guarantee that 
neither side would refuse the invitation to the talks.  Cousins asked how specific and 
direct the U.S. proposal for talks should be, Onyegbula said that there was no need to be 
too specific, but talks should begin before the first of November 1969.  Finally, 
Onyegbula said the Biafrans would be willing to negotiate without any preconditions so 
long as the FMG agreed to do the same.223 
Obviously satisfied with the Biafrans’ willingness to compromise, the 
Administration increased their direct involvement and sent Roger Morris to Norman 
Cousins’ New York apartment to speak directly with Onyegbula.  He also scheduled a 
separate meeting with Nigerian Foreign Minister Okoi Arikpo.  The meeting with the 
Biafran delegation occurred on September 25, 1969.  Morris explained to Kissinger in his 
memorandum of conversation that he spoke little in the meeting, but wanted to hear what 
the Biafrans had to say and ask some questions.   
Similar to the conversation with Cousins, the Biafrans agreed to “preliminary 
meetings without a cease-fire.”224 They added that Ojukwu could not attend any meeting 
without a ceasefire because it would be militarily disadvantageous for him to leave his 
army during the fighting.  The Biafrans also modified their previous statement, which had 
denied the need for a neutral third party to mediate any peace talks.  They explained that 
though the U.S. did not have to serve in that role, the U.S. would be the best country to 
fill the position since other nations had shown themselves too biased in the past.  They 
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agreed to OAU participation in the talks as long as their allies (Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, and Zambia) were among those countries participating.   
The Biafran delegation probed Morris on the Administration’s continued desire 
for OAU involvement in the civil war.  Morris explained the U.S. reasoning as three fold.  
1) U.S. did not want the settlement to appear to be imposed from the outside. 2) The 
Administration believed a lasting settlement would require the involvement of and 
enforcement by an external authority. 3) The U.S. believed in encouraging regional 
responsibility in the developing world.  The Biafrans explained that their most important 
consideration in any peace agreement was the security of the Igbo people.   
When asked by Morris about their feelings of the involvement outside parties in 
the peace talks, the Biafrans believed the Soviets would sabotage any peace efforts, but 
the British were integral in bringing the FMG to the table.  They also warned that the 
longer the war continued, the greater the Soviet influence would be in Nigeria.   
On the subject of relief, the Biafrans said that the ICRC agreement with the FMG 
for daylight relief flights was unacceptable and differed from the original agreement.  
They explained that the Nigerian’s had only agreed to the arrangement as long as it did 
not prejudice military operations by the FMG.  This exception essentially allowed the 
Nigerians to interdict the airfield whenever they desired and could use the excuse of 
military necessity to justify their actions.  As a result, the Biafrans could not accept the 
agreement, leaving night flights as the only acceptable solution to the situation.  The 
Biafrans indicated that daylight flights would be more acceptable if the U.S. promised to 
take action against the FMG if they violated their part of the agreement.   
97 
The delegation’s bottom line in the meeting was that they would not accept any 
peace resolution that called for a return to the political pre-war status quo.  They stated 
that they had fought too long and suffered too much at this point to give it all up to the 
Nigerians.225 
Kissinger met with Nigerian Foreign Minister Arikpo at the Nigerian 
Ambassador’s residence in Washington D.C. on October 15, 1969 to discuss the Nigerian 
position on peace negotiations.  Morris advised Kissinger to approach the Biafrans with a 
statement from the President guaranteeing the inviolability of the Red Cross daylight 
flights, and to lock the FMG into an agreement on the same.  Morris also advised 
Kissinger to let Arikpo do the talking in his meeting, but Morris gave him a few 
questions to ask the foreign minister:  Were the Federals willing to negotiate?  What they 
needed from Biafra to get started?  How could the U.S. help in the process?  He also 
asked Kissinger to explain to Arikpo that the U.S. was trying to get the Biafrans to accept 
daylight relief flights.226 
The Nigerian delegation opened the meeting with a summary of the military 
situation in their country.  Ambassador Iyalla said that the Biafrans were divided and 
weak and that “Nigerian victory was imminent.”227 Arikpo said that Biafran high 
“morale was an illusion.”228 He explained that the only reason Ojukwu was not facing 
serious challenges was that the various tribal groups within the region could not agree 
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among themselves.  He told Kissinger that the Igbos were a charismatic and savvy group 
who had led the rest of the unsophisticated people in the east into disaster.229 
Iyalla criticized the U.S. for its criticism of the FMG and the support of illegal 
relief flights.  He said the U.S. acted like Nigeria’s enemy instead of as their friend.  He 
felt the U.S. should support the FMG because a rebellion would have disastrous effects 
on Nigeria as well as the whole of Africa.  Kissinger countered these criticisms with a 
question of his own about why the FMG continued to be so hard on the U.S. yet treated 
the French with kid gloves despite their obvious support of the Biafrans?  “Arikpo replied 
that Nigeria would ‘have their pound of flesh’ from the French sooner or later.”230 They 
did not want to anger the French at this point in the conflict fearing that such a move 
might encourage greater French intervention that would prolong the war.   
Kissinger asked the delegation if the FMG interdict the airstrip at Uli to stop arms 
shipments.  Arikpo said that they could not because the Brits were unwilling to give them 
the type of military assistance they required and unwilling to ask for it from the Soviets.  
Kissinger then asked what kind of position was Gowon in within his own government?  
Arikpo explained that Gowon often stood alone as a voice of moderation against his own 
Executive Council.  An example of this was his unilateral agreement to daylight flights.  
“As for Gowon’s position, Arikpo said simply that a coup d’etat could ‘never be ruled 
out’ in a military regime.”  Baba Gana (the Nigerian permanent secretary for External 
Affairs) reiterated that Gowon’s agreement to daylight flights had been a bold and 
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generous move, and that the U.S. should publicly give them credit for it.  He also 
suggested that the rebels should have to “account for their refusal.”231 
Arikpo said, “General Gowon had often reflected… that the U.S. had no real 
interest in Nigeria.  Thus it was futile to expect any positive help from us.”232 Arikpo, 
obviously trying to remind Kissinger of the importance of Nigerian oil to the U.S., said 
that the U.S. did have a significant interest in Nigeria.  Arikpo added a veiled threat to 
Kissinger, in hopes of persuading him to give Nigeria more support, that “if we (the U.S.) 
did (have interests in Nigeria), we should be willing to take a hand in preserving that 
interest.”233 
The meeting ended with a discussion of a serious discussion of how the U.S. 
could assist in ending the war.  Specifically, Arikpo wondered if the U.S. would be 
willing to tell the French that the time had come to end this dangerous civil war.  He 
believed there was no question that the Biafran secession was quite simply an adventure 
conceived and sustained from the Elysee Palace.  He told Kissinger the French were the 
key to everything.   
If President Nixon is truly interested in ending the suffering and fighting, the U.S. 
would go to the French, make our own position clear on the preservation of 
Nigeria and offer, in effect, to act as a go-between among Paris and Lagos to help 
the FMG find out “the necessary price”.  The FMG was prepared, Arikpo said, to 
examine “what’s the deal.234 
Neither side still seemed willing to move from their original bargaining position.  
The Biafrans insisted on a ceasefire before beginning peace talks and the Nigerians 
demanded the preservation of Nigeria’s pre-war boundaries.  Both sides saw the value in 
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a U.S. brokered peace agreement, because both believed the U.S. would support their side 
of the conflict.  At this point the Administration must have realized their peace 
negotiations would do nothing more than those attempted by the OAU.   
 Roger Morris continued to support the Biafrans even in light of their recent 
refusal to agree to daylight relief flights.  Morris continued to try and prevent Kissinger 
from siding with the State Department and ending the peace talk and expanded relief 
negotiations.  On October 24, 1969, Morris warned Kissinger in another memorandum 
that the State Department was obstructing the President’s peace plan.  Though the State 
Department had agreed to develop a policy to meet the President’s wishes for an unbiased 
approach to the Nigerian peace process, Morris complained that they took six weeks and 
produced a plan “opposite to the President’s intentions.”235 He included a “bootleg copy” 
of a State Department memorandum from David Newsome to the Secretary of State 
outlining the situation in Nigeria.  Morris highlighted sections of the memorandum that 
he disagreed with and added editorial comments for Kissinger’s review.  Newsome’s 
assessment of the political situation in Nigeria he explained the two sticking points in the 
talks.  According to Newsome, Gowon insisted on Nigerian unity and Ojukwu demanded 
an unconditional ceasefire before talks.  Morris wrote, “Wrong for both!” in the margin 
of the page.  Another   passage emphasized the futility of negotiations stating the “asking 
prices are irreconcilable.”  Again, Morris wrote, “NO!” in the margin.  Obviously from 
Morris’ conversations with the Biafrans and Nigerians, he believed that both sides were 
more flexible than the memorandum suggested.   
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It appears that Morris believed Newsome was using inaccurate information to 
inject doubts in the Secretary of State’s mind on the subject of peace negotiations.  The 
memorandum concluded with two statements on the possibilities of negotiations with 
which Morris indicated his agreement.  The first stated, “While it is not our place to 
speculate *on the terms of settlement, we believe a basis for exploratory discussions 
exists.”236 The second addressed the role of outsiders in the conflict resolution.  
Newsome wrote he felt “direct U.S. mediating role is unwise and that we should confine 
ourselves to private, diplomatic support for American mediations efforts.”237 
Kissinger never sent a memorandum to Under-Secretary of State Elliot 
Richardson disclosing his staff’s secret negotiations with both sides in Nigeria.  Kissinger 
most likely did this to provide the White House with a cover in case their secret plans 
failed.  By allowing the State Department to continue its pro-Federal stance, Kissinger 
could assume that the U.S. would retain the sympathies of the Nigerian government.  
Regardless of his intentions, the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Lagos 
continued to push for greater support of the FMG.  In a telegram from the Ambassador to 
the Assistant Secretary of State, David Newsome pushed for a public statement form the 
U.S. government announcing Biafra’s unwillingness to accept the daylight relief flight 
agreement.  He told Newsome that such a statement could potentially help the relief 
situation by forcing the Biafrans to accept the agreement.  From a diplomatic perspective, 
such an action would let all of the parties involved know that if the U.S. threatened to 
take an action (like their threats to make a public statement in case of disagreement to a 
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plan) they would follow through.  Newsome’s last point, the point he believed was the 
most important, was that forcing daylight relief flights would prevent other expensive 
relief schemes from developing.  He was referring specifically to Clyde Ferguson’s latest 
plan for the U.S. deployment of an aircraft carrier and helicopters to the region to airlift 
relief supplies into Biafra.  He viewed this plan as cost prohibitive and explained it would 
drastically increase U.S. involvement in the conflict.238 
U.S. Halts Diplomatic Efforts 
With the Biafran official refusal to allow daylight relief flights into their territory 
despite Presidential assurances for their safety, even pro-Biafran Roger Morris 
recognized the need to distance the Administration from the Biafran cause.  He sent a 
memorandum to Kissinger prior to Kissinger’s lunch meeting with Elliot Richardson 
recommending the U.S. should “bring the Biafrans to public account eventually for their 
rejection (if it sticks) simply to protect the President.”239 While Morris recognized the 
futility of negotiating the daylight relief flight plan, he did not give up on the peace 
negotiation possibilities.  Morris recommended that Kissinger “suggest to Richardson 
that he take a very flexible, even-handed approach on the problem in his talks with the 
British and the French.”240 Morris believed the State Department should not overly defer 
to British demands in any peace negotiations, and “should not turn a deaf ear to the 
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overtures from the French, when the Federalists are asking us to have a dialogue with the 
Quai on ending the war.”241 
Kissinger must have agreed with Morris’ recommendation on exposing Biafra’s 
unwillingness to agree to the daylight relief plan because two weeks later the State 
Department issued a statement on the state of U.S. relief efforts in the Nigerian Civil 
War.  The State Department’s press release discussed the steps the U.S. had taken to 
assist the relief operations including the appointment of Clyde Ferguson, $65 million in 
U.S. relief donations, and failed attempts to arrange bi-lateral peace agreements.  The 
statement explained that current relief efforts were not enough at this time to end the 
suffering.  The ICRC had suspended night relief flights, and the remaining flights were 
also used to bring weapons into Biafra.  The statement highlighted the FMG agreement to 
daylight flights on 13 September 1969 but added that the Biafrans had not approved the 
plan and cited security concerns.  Though the President had worked to ensure security for 
the flights with the FMG and UN observers, the Biafrans refused to accept this vital relief 
option.  The Biafrans had shifted their attention to a waterborne relief operation on the 
Cross River, despite the fact that water levels in the River would not be high enough for 
months to support large-scale river traffic.  During the intervening months people would 
starve.  The press statement concluded that daylight flights were the only way to get food 
in sufficient quantities now.242 
At this point, Henry Kissinger and President Nixon seemed to have washed their 
hands of the whole affair.  Kissinger did not send Nixon any further status reports or 
 
241 Morris to Kissinger “Nigeria/Biafra at your lunch with Elliot Richardson today”, OCT. 30, 1969; NSC 
Country Files; NACP. 
242 Copy of State Department Press Release “Status of US Relief Efforts”, NOV. 11, 1969; NSC Country 
Files; NACP. 
104 
pursue any more secret negotiations.  Even with reports of the continued starvation crisis 
in Eastern Nigeria after the war ended, Nixon asked Kissinger, “‘They’re going to let 
them starve, aren’t they Henry?’…‘Yes’, came the almost perfunctory answer, and the 
two men went on to discuss foreign policy passages in the coming speech.”243 The State 
Department press release had obviously provided the Administration with a way to 
publicly discredit the Biafrans and justify their disengagement with the Nigerian Civil 
War to the American public.   
At the same time, public interest in the Nigerian Civil War had also begun to 
wane in the U.S.  The number of New York Times articles about Nigeria or Biafra had 
dropped in half from an average of 29 articles throughout Nixon’s first nine months in 
office to an average of 16 between October and December 1969.244 Meanwhile, the 
ICRC halted all relief operations for the duration of the war.  The U.S. continued to send 
relief donations through the religious-based relief organizations, but the White House 
stopped all senior level attempts to negotiate alternative relief methods.  By January 12, 
1970, Biafra had surrendered and the Nixon White House could finally turn its attention 
elsewhere. 
 
243 Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 129. 
244 New York Times Company, New York Times Index 1969, vol. 57 (New York: New York Times 
Company, 1970). 
VIII Conclusions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Biafran images of starving children increased the interest of the American people and 
their Presidents in the conduct of the Nigerian Civil War.  Both Presidents focused most 
of their concern for the starving people caught in between the warring sides.  With few 
exceptions, neither Johnson nor Nixon was ever particularly interested in the survival of 
an independent Biafra.  Most Americans did not understand who the Biafrans were or 
why they had chosen to secede, and most politicians saw a unified Nigeria as best serving 
the interests of the United States.  Given these general feelings, the Nixon Administration 
needed to craft a foreign policy towards Nigeria that provided the maximum amount of 
relief to the civilian victims of the war without endangering the U.S. relationship with 
Nigeria.   
The Johnson Administration had attempted to follow a neutral course that 
acknowledged the conflict as an internal Nigerian problem.  Biafran propaganda 
highlighting the problems of this policy to the American public, forced the Nixon 
Administration to differentiate its position.  Despite an original inclination to support the 
Biafrans, Kissinger eventually convinced Nixon to pursue a policy that highly publicized 
relief efforts while doing little diplomatically to solve the war.  As the humanitarian crisis 
continued into the late spring1969, and the ICRC halted its relief flights in to Biafra after 
the downing of one of their aircraft, the American public demanded more U.S. action.  
Kissinger advised Nixon on a second policy option; aggressively pursue additional relief 
operations while secretly testing each side’s willingness to compromise.  This action 
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would placate the U.S. public and protect the Administration from publicly attempting to 
negotiate an end to the war.   
Though the U.S. negotiation attempts were never successful at devising a peaceful 
solution to the war, it was able to do what no other negotiation attempts had been able to 
achieve before: insinuate Ojukwu’s complicity in the starvation of his own people.  In 
previous negotiations, both Gowon and Ojukwu had either refused part or all of any 
proposed agreement.  The Nixon Administration’s efforts to gain Gowon’s support of 
daylight relief flights proved, at least to the satisfaction of the Administration, that 
Biafran secession was about Ojukwu’s desire for power and not the safety of the Igbo 
people.  Once the Nixon Administration had discredited Ojukwu publicly in the State 
Department press release outlining the Biafran unwillingness to allow relief flights to 
their own people, all U.S. attempts to intervene in the war ceased.  Compared to the near 
monthly updates drafted by Kissinger for the President, the Archives contained no such 
memorandums after October 1969.  There was also no evidence the Administration 
simply believed the war would end soon and further efforts were futile.  On the contrary, 
it would appear that no one involved in the conflict, except perhaps the Biafran soldiers 
realized how soon the war would end in the fall of 1969.  Perhaps predictably, while 
Ojukwu’s propaganda kept his dream of an independent Biafra alive for nearly three 
years against incredible odds, the eventual failure of his propaganda message hastened its 
ultimate downfall.
107 
Appendix I Chart indicating increases and decreases in U.S. public interest in the 
Nigerian Civil War based on the number of articles appearing in the New York Times 
U.S. Interest in the Nigerian Civil War
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(Raw data showing the number of 
articles in the New York Times about 
Nigeria/Biafra by month and year*.) 
 
Date   # of Articles
January 1966   21 
February   5 
March     0 
April    1 
May    6 
June    10 
July    3 
August    21 
September   13 
October   18 
November   6 
December   4 
 
January 1967   10 
February   2 
March     11 
April    9 
May    10 
June    14 
July    27 
August    32 
September   29 
October   25 
November   19 
December   4 
 
January 1968   14 
February   14 
March     6 
April    22 
May    29 
June    11 
July    48 
August    79 
September   53 
October   37 
November   28 
December   38 
 
* New York Times Company, New York Times 
Index, 1966-1970, vols. 54-58. (New York: New 
York Times Company, 1967-1971). 
 
January 1969   30 
February   37 
March     37 
April    25 
May    21 
June    23 
July    28 
August    27 
September   29 
October   15 
November   16 
December   17 
 
January 1970   110 
February   28 
March     15 
April    6 
May    4 
June    6 
July    4 
August    10 
September   4 
October   9 
November   4 
December   3 
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